Credit analysts often leave rating agencies to work at firms they rate. We use benchmark rating agencies as counterfactuals to measure rating inflation in a difference-in-differences framework and find that transitioning analysts award inflated ratings to their future employers before switching jobs. We find no evidence that analysts inflate ratings of other firms they rate. Market based measures of hiring firms' credit quality further indicate that transitioning analysts' inflated ratings become less informative. We conclude that conflicts of interest at the analyst level distort credit ratings. More broadly, our results shed light on the economic consequences of revolving doors.

We investigate the effects of opioid abuse on municipal finance. We employ instrumental variables, border discontinuity difference-in-differences regressions, and coarsened exact matching to identify consistent causal effects, while controlling for variation in economic conditions and demographics. Opioid abuse lowers credit ratings, increases new offer yields, and reduces bond issuance. Reversal of these effects following effective antiopioid legislation further supports causality. Differential effects due to investor heterogeneity suggest that opioid abuse affects municipal finance through a capital supply channel. Overall, we conclude that local opioid abuse impedes municipalities’ access to capital and thus hurts their ability to provide public services and infrastructure.