We investigate an alternative economic channel of a positive relationship between risk and compensation, as documented by Cheng et al. (2015). We propose that when information asymmetry exists, firms generally seek to use compensation as a signal of their CEOs’ ability. The risks arising from information asymmetry tend to encourage firms to pay higher compensation to their CEOs in a pattern of financial incentives we call the “Lake Wobegon effect”. However, when individual firms pursue complete signaling, a higher equilibrium compensation level can be achieved. This paper explores the factors that give rise to the “Lake Wobegon effect” and the learning process by which this effect can be counterbalanced over time (Hayes and Schaefer, 2009).

This study investigates the relationship between internet penetration and venture capital (VC) investment in China. Exploiting staggered inclusion in demonstration cities under the Broadband China strategy as a positive shock to internet penetration, our difference-in-differences analysis shows that this policy shock results in an increase in VC investments in demonstration cities relative to others. Moreover, the increase in VC investments is concentrated in early stage financing and young start-ups. In terms of VC fund sources, we find a stronger effect on foreign and independent VCs. Our mechanism analysis suggests that the effect of the broadband rollout is mainly driven by cities with higher ex-ante costs of information acquisition and that such costs are reduced by the improvement of internet-based network infrastructure. Finally, we provide additional evidence on the benefits to established companies by showing that broadband rollout improves the information environment of listed firms. Our study sheds new light on the economic consequences of infrastructure development that reduces information acquisition costs in China.

We analyze a model in which traders have different trading opportunities and learn information from prices. The difference in trading opportunities implies that different traders may have different trading motives when trading in the same market—some trade for speculation and others for hedging—and thus they may respond to the same information in opposite directions. This implies that adding more informed traders may reduce price informativeness and therefore provides a source for learning complementarities leading to multiple equilibria and price jumps. Our model is relevant to various realistic settings and helps to understand a variety of modern financial markets.

We combine national accounts, surveys, and new tax data to study the accumulation and distribution of income and wealth in China from 1978 to 2015. The national wealth-income ratio increased from 350 percent in 1978 to 700 percent in 2015, while the share of public property in national wealth declined from 70 percent to 30 percent. We provide sharp upward revision of official inequality estimates. The top 10 percent income share rose from 27 percent to 41 percent between 1978 and 2015; the bottom 50 percent share dropped from 27 percent to 15 percent. China’s inequality levels used to be close to Nordic countries and are now approaching US levels.

This study examines the association between customer base concentration and corporate public disclosure policy. When the customer base is more concentrated, large customers face lower costs of accessing the supplier firm's private information, reducing customers' overall demand for the supplier's public information, suggesting a negative association between customer concentration and the amount of public disclosure. Alternatively, large customers have greater bargaining power and may demand that the supplier firm provide more public disclosures. Consistent with customer concentration facilitating private information flow from the supplier to customers, we find that the frequencies of management earnings and sales forecasts are negatively associated with customer concentration among firms with major corporate customers. These associations are stronger when the supplier and customers are engaged in more relationship‐specific investments, when customers' private information acquisition costs are lower, and when it is less costly for customers to find another supplier.

Directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance) is one of the most controversial and least understood governance tools. Using manually collected voting data for all director types at Chinese listed firms, we provide the first evidence for the impact of D&O insurance on directors’ voting decisions and the subsequent effects on corporate governance and financial performance. We find that independent directors at firms carrying D&O insurance are more likely to dissent when benchmarked against their peers in the same firm on the same proposal. Our results are robust to endogeneity checks. We identify channels through which the incentive effects of D&O insurance operate. We also find that the positive effect of D&O insurance on independent director dissension is associated with better firm performance and monitoring outcomes, including less litigation and lower claim values, less underinvestment, better internal control quality, and improved CEO pay- and turnover-performance sensitivities.

This study investigates the underexplored role of onsite viewing activities in the housing search process. By incorporating buyer heterogeneity into the housing search model of Courant (1978), we show that buyers with higher private valuations tend to view more properties onsite and ultimately pay higher prices. Utilising a proprietary dataset from the largest real estate agency in Beijing, our analysis reveals that increased onsite viewings significantly enhance both the likelihood of a transaction and the final purchase price. We establish causality by employing an instrumental variable approach that leverages exogenous variations in heavy pollution and rainfall, which hinder buyers’ ability to conduct onsite house viewings. More intensive onsite viewings raise transaction price as they reveal a buyer’s higher private valuation to the seller. Besides, onsite viewings also function through reducing information asymmetry and improving match quality.

Organizations are increasingly utilizing remote monitoring tools that can track the total time telecommuting employees spend on work activities. We examine whether and how this information can eliminate a specific gender-based bias in the performance evaluations of telecommuting parents. Specifically, managers tend to evaluate telecommuting mothers less favorably than telecommuting fathers when performance outcomes are unfavorable, due to biased effort attribution. The availability of total work-time information can effectively eliminate this bias. Results from our main experiment and four supplemental experiments support our predictions and provide process-level evidence for our theory. Our theory and results suggest that leveraging remote monitoring tools’ capacity to track employees’ total work time can enhance the fairness and effectiveness of performance evaluations for telecommuting mothers.

Siblings are important sources of support. Male siblings, in particular, are valuable extended family resources in patriarchal societies such as China. This paper examines the effects of the number of brothers on household stock market participation in China. We find that having more brothers increases both the probability of stock market participation and the portfolio share in stocks. This positive effect is more pronounced for individuals who face high income risk, suffer from poor health, lack private insurance, and reside in areas with low financial development and high gender discrimination. In addition, the brother effect persists in recent periods. This evidence highlights the importance of informal risk-sharing networks in household investment decisions. Our results imply that demographic changes such as fertility decline might have unnoticed but sizable impacts on household portfolio choice, especially in countries with strong family ties.