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Should Taxpayers Be Subsidized to Hire Third‐Party Preparers? A Game‐Theoretic Analysis*

Contemporary Accounting Research 1994 11(1), 553-594
This article examines the tax‐compliance game between taxpayers, a tax‐collecting agency, and third‐party tax‐return preparers. In our model, taxpayers are uncertain about their taxable income and may hire tax practitioners to reduce tax uncertainty. We examine the viability of tax practitioners as a signaling device (taking into account the effects on the behavior of the tax‐collecting agency) and investigate the desirability of encouraging (or discouraging) the use of tax practitioners via the use of alternative tax‐crediting rules. Our study establishes that tax crediting enables legislators to deal better with the consequences of taxpayers' strategic reporting. We show that the effects of changes in crediting rates cannot be replicated by changes in tax rates or penalties; the government would generally like to “price discriminate” in subsidizing tax practitioners' involvement in the tax‐compliance process. It is suboptimal to permit all taxpayers to take a tax credit for preparers' fees; some taxpayers should be denied such a subsidy. Further, if the government is constrained to adopt an identical credit schedule for all taxpayers, it will often find that a policy allowing no tax credit Pareto dominates any uniform crediting policy. Résumé. Les auteurs examinent le jeu auquel se livrent, en matière d'observation de la législation fiscale, les contribuables, les agences de perception de l'impôt et les tiers chargés de la préparation des déclarations de revenus. Dans le modèle retenu par les auteurs, les contribuables sont incertains de leur revenu imposable et peuvent recourir aux services de fiscalistes dans le but de réduire cette incertitude. Les auteurs se penchent sur le caractère indicatif du choix du fiscaliste (en tenant compte de l'influence qu'exerce l'agence de perception sur le comportement) et se demandent s'il convient d'encourager les contribuables à recourir aux fiscalistes ou de les en dissuader au moyen de différents mécanismes de dégrèvement fiscal. L'étude démontre que le dégrèvement fiscal permet au législateur de mieux faire face aux conséquences des stratégies de déclaration des contribuables. L'on constate que la modification des taux d'imposition ou des pénalités ne livre pas les mêmes résultats que la modification des taux de dégrèvement; l'État vise généralement la ≪ discrimination en fonction du prix ≫ en subventionnant le recours aux fiscalistes dans le processus d'observation fiscale. Il ne serait pas optimal de permettre à tous les contribuables de se prévaloir d'un crédit d'impôt pour les honoraires des auteurs de leurs déclarations; une telle subvention devrait être refusée à certains contribuables. En outre, si l'État se voit contraint d'adopter un programme de dégrèvement identique pour tous les contribuables, il constatera dans bien des cas qu'une politique ne permettant aucun dégrèvement est supérieure, au sens de Pareto, à toute politique de dégrèvement uniforme.

The Experimental Design of Classification Models: An Application of Recursive Partitioning and Bootstrapping to Commercial Bank Loan Classifications

Journal of Accounting Research 1984 22, 87
M. Laurentius Marais, James M. Patell, Mark A. Wolfson, The Experimental Design of Classification Models: An Application of Recursive Partitioning and Bootstrapping to Commercial Bank Loan Classifications, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 22, Studies on Current Econometric Issues in Accounting Research (1984), pp. 87-114

Tax Planning, Regulatory Capital Planning, and Financial Reporting Strategy for Commercial Banks

Review of Financial Studies 1990 3(4), 625-650
We test whether banks’ investment and financing policies can be explained by tax status. We document changes in bank holdings of municipal bonds in response to changes in tax rules relating to deductibility of interest expense. We also document an association between banks’ marginal tax rates and their investment and financing decisions, which is consistent with the existence of tax clienteles. However, banks do not sort themselves perfectly into investment and financing clienteles because of adjustment costs. We posit specific types of transaction-cost impediments to tax planning, and document that banks apparently trade off these costs against tax-planning benefits.

Tax Planning, Regulatory Capital Planning, and Financial Reporting Strategy for Commercial Banks

Review of Financial Studies 1990 3(4), 625-650
[We test whether banks' investment and financing policies can be explained by tax status. We document changes in bank holdings of municipal bonds in response to changes in tax rules relating to deductibility of interest expense. We also document an association between banks' marginal tax rates and their investment and financing decisions, which is consistent with the existence of tax clienteles. However, banks do not sort themselves perfectly into investment and financing clienteles because of adjustment costs. We posit specific types of transaction-cost impediments to tax planning, and document that banks apparently trade off these costs against tax-planning benefits.]

Decentralized Choice of Monitoring Systems.

The Accounting Review 1984 59(1), 16-34
This paper presents an agency model in which one of several monitoring systems can be chosen, if the agent possesses private information about the firm's production technology, the principal may rationally prefer to delegate the choice of the monitor to the agent even though the agent's compensation will depend on the monitoring information. In general, this expansion of the contracting space allows the principal to orchestrate more efficiently the agent's effort and monitoring system choices. The model suggests that the existence of alternative accounting methods and the delegation of their selection to management may represent rational equilibrium behavior.

Income Taxes and Tax-Transfer Leases: General Electric's Accounting for A Molotov Cocktail.

The Accounting Review 1983 58(2), 439-459
General Electric uses the equity method of financial accounting for its subsidiary, General Electric Credit Corporation, but consolidates it on the tax return. This note disentangles the amounts and sources of cash payments and refunds for income taxes of the two companies, with special emphasis on the effect of tax-transfer leases. It shows how to estimate the elements of the costs and benefits of tax-transfer leasing. Through tax-transfer leases, General Electric paid its lessees about $350 million in 1981 for benefits estimated to be worth on the order of $500 million, net. These transactions contributed to GE's being able to arrange its tax affairs to receive a refund of $104 million from the U. S. Treasury, while paying over $300 million in taxes to foreign governments and $54 million to state and local governments.