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The Economic Impacts of Climate Change: Evidence from Agricultural Output and Random Fluctuations in Weather: Reply

American Economic Review 2012 102(7), 3761-3773 open access
Fisher et al. (2012)––henceforth, FHRS––have uncovered coding and data errors in our paper, Deschênes and Greenstone (2007), henceforth, DG. We acknowledge and are embarrassed by these mistakes. We are grateful to FHRS for uncovering them. We hope that this Reply will also contribute to advancing the literature on the vital question of the impact of climate change on the US agricultural sector.

The Economic Impacts of Climate Change: Evidence from Agricultural Output and Random Fluctuations in Weather

American Economic Review 2007 97(1), 354-385 open access
This paper measures the economic impact of climate change on US agricultural land by estimating the effect of random year-to-year variation in temperature and precipitation on agricultural profits. The preferred estimates indicate that climate change will increase annual profits by $1.3 billion in 2002 dollars (2002$) or 4 percent. This estimate is robust to numerous specification checks and relatively precise, so large negative or positive effects are unlikely. We also find the hedonic approach—which is the standard in the previous literature—to be unreliable because it produces estimates that are extremely sensitive to seemingly minor choices about control variables, sample, and weighting.

Do Energy Efficiency Investments Deliver? Evidence from the Weatherization Assistance Program*

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2018 133(3), 1597-1644
A growing number of policies and programs aim to increase investment in energy efficiency, because conventional wisdom suggests that people fail to take up these investments even though they have positive private returns and generate environmental benefits. Many explanations for this energy efficiency gap have been put forward, but there has been surprisingly little field testing of whether the conventional wisdom is correct. This article reports on the results of an experimental evaluation of the nation’s largest residential energy efficiency program—the Weatherization Assistance Program—conducted on a sample of approximately 30,000 households in Michigan. The findings suggest that the upfront investment costs are about twice the actual energy savings. Furthermore, the model-projected savings are more than three times the actual savings. Although this might be attributed to the “rebound” effect—when demand for energy end uses increases as a result of greater efficiency—the article fails to find evidence of significantly higher indoor temperatures at weatherized homes. Even when accounting for the broader societal benefits derived from emissions reductions, the costs still substantially outweigh the benefits; the average rate of return is approximately −7.8% annually.

Truth-telling by Third-party Auditors and the Response of Polluting Firms: Experimental Evidence from India*

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2013 128(4), 1499-1545 open access
In many regulated markets, private, third-party auditors are chosen and paid by the firms that they audit, potentially creating a conflict of interest. This article reports on a two-year field experiment in the Indian state of Gujarat that sought to curb such a conflict by altering the market structure for environmental audits of industrial plants to incentivize accurate reporting. There are three main results. First, the status quo system was largely corrupted, with auditors systematically reporting plant emissions just below the standard, although true emissions were typically higher. Second, the treatment caused auditors to report more truthfully and very significantly lowered the fraction of plants that were falsely reported as compliant with pollution standards. Third, treatment plants, in turn, reduced their pollution emissions. The results suggest reformed incentives for third-party auditors can improve their reporting and make regulation more effective.

Are the Non-Monetary Costs of Energy Efficiency Investments Large? Understanding Low Take-up of a Free Energy Efficiency Program

American Economic Review 2015 105(5), 201-204
We document very low take-up of an energy efficiency program that is widely believed to be privately beneficial. Program participants receive a substantial home “weatherization” retrofit; all installation and equipment costs are covered by the program. Less than 1 percent of presumptively eligible households take up the program in the control group. This rate increased only modestly after we took extraordinary efforts to inform households—via multiple channels–about the sizable benefits and zero monetary costs. These findings are consistent with high non-monetary costs associated with program participation and/or energy efficiency investments.

Climate Change and Birth Weight

American Economic Review 2009 99(2), 211-217 open access
There is a growing consensus that emissions of greenhouse gases due to human activity will alter the earth’s climate, most notably by causing temperatures, precipitation levels, and weather variability to increase. The design of optimal climate change mitigation policies requires estimates of the health and other benefits of reductions in greenhouse gases; current evidence on the magnitude of the direct and indirect impacts, however, is considered insufficient for reliable conclusions (A. J. McMichael et al. 2003).

The Value of Regulatory Discretion: Estimates From Environmental Inspections in India

Econometrica 2018 86(6), 2123-2160 open access
High pollution persists in many developing countries despite strict environmental rules. We use a field experiment and a structural model to study how plant emission standards are enforced. In collaboration with an Indian environmental regulator, we experimentally doubled the rate of inspection for treatment plants and required that the extra inspections be assigned randomly. We find that treatment plants only slightly increased compliance. We hypothesize that this weak effect is due to poor targeting, since the random inspections in the treatment found fewer extreme violators than the regulator's own discretionary inspections. To unbundle the roles of extra inspections and the removal of discretion over what plants to target, we set out a model of environmental regulation where the regulator targets inspections, based on a signal of pollution, to maximize plant abatement. Using the experiment to identify key parameters of the model, we find that the regulator aggressively targets its discretionary inspections, to the degree that half of the plants receive fewer than one inspection per year, while plants expected to be the dirtiest may receive ten. Counterfactual simulations show that discretion in targeting helps enforcement: inspections that the regulator assigns cause three times more abatement than would the same number of randomly assigned inspections. Nonetheless, we find that the regulator's information on plant pollution is poor, and improvements in monitoring would reduce emissions.

Identifying Agglomeration Spillovers: Evidence from Winners and Losers of Large Plant Openings

Journal of Political Economy 2010 118(3), 536-598
We quantify agglomeration spillovers by comparing changes in total factor productivity (TFP) among incumbent plants in "winning" counties that attracted a large manufacturing plant and "losing" counties that were the new plant's runner-up choice. Winning and losing counties have similar trends in TFP prior to the new plant opening. Five years after the opening, incumbent plants' TFP is 12 percent higher in winning counties. This productivity spillover is larger for plants sharing similar labor and technology pools with the new plant. Consistent with spatial equilibrium models, labor costs increase in winning counties, indicating that profits ultimately increase less than productivity.

Man vs. Machine: Technological Promise and Political Limits of Automated Regulation Enforcement

The Review of Economics and Statistics 2025 107(4), 1136-1148
New technologies allow perfect detection of environmental violations at near-zero marginal cost, but take-up is low. We conducted a field experiment to evaluate enforcement of water conservation rules with smart meters in Fresno, CA. Households were randomly assigned combinations of enforcement method (automated or in-person inspections) and fines. Automated enforcement increased households’ punishment rates from 0.1% to 14%, decreased summer water use by 3%, and reduced violations by 17%, while higher fine levels had little effect. However, automated enforcement also increased customer complaints by 1,102%, ultimately causing its cancellation and highlighting that political considerations limit technological solutions to enforcement challenges.