This paper studies the stability of competitive equilibria in a model of aggregate employment when the representative agent uses a least-squares forecasting procedure. It is shown that the Pareto inferior low employment steady state is always unstable under least-squares learning, even if it is stable under perfect foresight. The high employment steady state is stable under learning if and only if it is saddle point stable under perfect foresight. This weakens multiple equilibrium theories of coordination failure that purport to explain persistently high unemployment. The Pareto superior high employment steady state will be the focal point of individual forecasting.

Journal Article The Pasinetti Paradox Revisited Get access B. J. Moore B. J. Moore Wesleyan University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 41, Issue 2, April 1974, Pages 297–299, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296719 Published: 01 April 1974

We provide evidence that equity investors are slow to process information about how current oil price changes affect future earnings announcements. Stock prices respond to lagged quarterly oil price changes when firms start announcing earnings in the next quarter. A cross-sectional equity trading strategy that exploits this predictability yields an annualized Sharpe ratio of 0.50. Our oil-response forecast strategy earns especially high returns after large absolute oil price changes, in recessions or bear markets, and during peak earnings season. The predictability we document is consistent with limited attention, is not driven by risk factor exposure, and survives several robustness tests.

The purpose of this paper is to model the legal exposure of auditors and to study the extent to which limitations on this exposure affect auditors' chosen audit intensity and collusion with management. Résumé. L'article qui suit a pour but de modéliser les risques auxquels sont exposés les vérificateurs de par la loi et de voir dans quelle mesure les limites de ce risque influent sur l'intensité de la vérification dont décident les vérificateurs et sur la collusion avec la direction.

Journal Article Economies of Scale: Some Statistical Evidence: Reply Get access Frederick T. Moore Frederick T. Moore The RAND Corporation, Washington, D.C. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 74, Issue 3, August 1960, Pages 497–499, https://doi.org/10.2307/1883064 Published: 01 August 1960

I. Statement of the problem, 232. — II. The evidence from some previous studies, 233. — III. The “.6 factor” rule and its application, 234. — IV. Specific evidence in a selection of metal processing and chemical industries, 236. — V. Studies of selected mineral industries, 239. — VI. Conclusions, 242.

Simple and complex demand functions, 587. — An index number of oscillations of most probable prices, 591. — Price oscillations in relation to partial flexibilities of prices, 592. — A clue to periodic oscillations or cycles, 593. — Conclusions, 594.

Introduction, 1. — Walrasian equations, 3. — Partial elasticity of demand, 9. — Partial elasticity of supply, 15. — Coefficients of production, 17. — A moving general equilibrium, 23. — Economic oscillations, 26. — Conclusions, 28.

Elasticity of demand and flexibility of prices, 394. — Equations to simple demand curves, 395. — Partial flexibility of prices, and partial elasticity of demand, 396. — Equations to demand functions revealing the partial elasticities and partial flexibilities, 398. — Conclusions, 400.

Elasticity of demand and flexibility of prices. — Relative cost of production and relative efficiency of organization, 359. — Laws of relative cost and relative return as contrasted with laws of cost and laws of return, 360. — Typical equations to the law of supply, 364. — The statistical derivation of the law of supply, 367. — A moving equilibrium of demand and supply, 368.