We estimate the impact of compulsory schooling on earnings using changes in compulsory schooling laws in West Germany after World War II. Most estimates in the literature indicate returns in the range of 10 to 15. While our research design is very similar to studies for various other countries, we find a zero return. We find no evidence that this is due to labor market institutions or the apprenticeship training system in Germany. The result might be due to the fact that the basic skills most relevant for the labor market are learned earlier in Germany than in other countries.

We estimate that unemployment insurance (UI) extensions reduce reemployment wages using sharp age discontinuities in UI eligibility in Germany. We show this effect combines two key policy parameters: the effect of UI on reservation wages and the effect of nonemployment durations on wage offers. Our framework implies if UI extensions do not affect wages conditional on duration, then reservation wages do not bind. We derive resulting instrumental variable estimates for the effect of nonemployment durations on wage offers and bounds for reservation wage effects. The effect of UI on wages we find arises mainly from substantial negative nonemployment duration effects.

We summarize findings from an audit study investigating how unemployment duration, age, and holding a low-level “interim” job affect the likelihood that experienced college-educated females applying for administrative support jobs receive a callback from potential employers. The results show no relationship between callback rates and unemployment duration. In contrast, workers age 50 and older and workers with an “interim” job are significantly less likely to receive callbacks. We also summarize disparate findings in the growing literature of resume-based audit studies of career histories, and discuss avenues in which the literature could achieve results that are more comparable and externally valid.

The majority of papers analyzing the employment effects of unemployment insurance (UI) benefit durations focus on the duration of the first unemployment spell. In this paper, we make two contributions. First, we use a regression discontinuity design to analyze the long-term effects of extensions in UI durations. These estimates differ from standard estimates in that they incorporate differences in UI benefit receipt and employment due to recurrent unemployment spells. Second, we derive a welfare formula of UI extensions that incorporates recurrent nonemployment spells.

Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) awards rise during recessions. If marginal applicants are able to work but unable to find jobs, countercyclical Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefit extensions may reduce SSDI uptake. Exploiting UI extensions in the Great Recession as a source of variation, we find no indication that expiration of UI benefits causes SSDI applications and can rule out effects of meaningful magnitude. A supplementary analysis finds little overlap between the two programs' recipient populations: only 28% of SSDI awardees had any labor force attachment in the prior calendar year, and of those, only 4% received UI.

We use a résumé audit study to investigate the role of employment and unemployment histories in callbacks to job applications. We find that applicants with 52 weeks of unemployment have a lower callback rate than those with shorter spells. There is no relationship, however, between spell length and callback among applicants with spells of 24 weeks or less. We also find that both younger and older applicants have a lower callback probability than prime-aged applicants. Finally, we find that applicants who are employed at the time of application have a lower callback rate than do unemployed applicants.

This paper shows that more highly concentrated labour markets experience more positive employment effects of the minimum wage. In the most concentrated labour markets, employment rises following a minimum wage increase. The paper establishes its main findings by studying the effects of local minimum wage increases on a key low-wage retail sector, and using data on labour market concentration that covers the entirety of the U.S. with fine spatial variation at the occupation level. The results carry over to the fast-food sector and the entire low-wage labour market and are robust to using proxies of labour market concentration available for a broader range of industries, such as the number of establishments and population density. A model of oligopsonistic competition can explain these effects: there is more room to increase wages in high-concentration areas where wages tend to be further below marginal productivity. These findings provide evidence supporting monopsonistic wage setting as an explanation for the near-zero minimum wage employment effect documented in prior work.

We use a massive, matched employer-employee database for the United States to analyze the contribution of firms to the rise in earnings inequality from 1978 to 2013. We find that one-third of the rise in the variance of (log) earnings occurred within firms, whereas two-thirds of the rise occurred due to a rise in the dispersion of average earnings between firms. However, this rising between-firm variance is not accounted for by the firms themselves but by a widening gap between firms in the composition of their workers. This compositional change can be split into two roughly equal parts: high-wage workers became increasingly likely to work in high-wage firms (i.e., sorting increased), and high-wage workers became increasingly likely to work with each other (i.e., segregation rose). In contrast, we do not find a rise in the variance of firm-specific pay once we control for the worker composition in firms. Finally, we find that two-thirds of the rise in the within-firm variance of earnings occurred within mega (10,000+ employee) firms, which saw a particularly large increase in the variance of earnings compared with smaller firms.

We document variation in working conditions in the United States, present estimates of how workers value these conditions, and assess the impact of working conditions on estimates of wage inequality. We conduct a series of stated-preference experiments to estimate workers’ willingness to pay for a broad set of working conditions, which we validate with actual job choices. We find that working conditions vary substantially, play a significant role in job choice, and are central components of the compensation received by workers. We find that accounting for differences in preferences for working conditions often exacerbates wage differentials and intensifies measures of wage inequality.