Introduction; the interest in real estate taxes, 96.— I. Causes of this interest: depressed conditions, 97; rising taxes, 97; the “real” burden of taxes, 98. — II. The question of disproportionate burden; the popular opinion, 100; the problem of measurement: the methods used, 101; their defects, 102; capitalization, 103; benefit considerations, 110.— III. The question of relative burden on rural and urban property, 115.— IV. The case for tax reduction; rigidity; discriminatory assessment, 116; the “obligation of payment,” 118; some obstacles, 118. — V. Some methods of relief; curbing expenditures, 120; alternative taxes in general, 121; the income tax, 122; exemption of buildings, 123.— VI. The proposal of an increment tax, 124. — VII. The proposal of a change in the character of taxes; Professor Kendrick's suggestions, 125.— VIII. Conclusions, 127.

The Literature on the Sales Tax Get access K. M. Williamson K. M. Williamson Wesleyan University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 35, Issue 4, August 1921, Pages 618–633, https://doi.org/10.2307/1882429 Published: 01 August 1921

I. Introduction, 40.—II. A neoclassical approach to labor absorption with factor price variability, 42.—III. Asian history and simulation: a look at the models' predictions, 49.—IV. Estimation with Philippine manufacturing data, 54.—V. Conclusion, 64.

I. Introduction, 93. — II. Economic growth in the Philippines: the initial reconnaissance, 95. — III. Education as a source of PhiHppine growth, 99. — IV. An hypothesis and a comparative evaluation: Asia and Latin America, 105. — V. Summary, 108.

Introduction, 579. — I. A gross description, 580. — II. A dynamic model, 582; the interfirm relationships, 582; a differential equations model, 585; proposed measurements, 594. — III. Extensions, 595; a self-recovery mechanism, 596; the influence of structure, 599; the effects of regulatory restraint, 603.— IV. Conclusions, 606.

ing the International Monetary Fund (IMF) lend to its member countries? At a somewhat abstract level, I would suggest that it could be defined as that of easing the external constraint on its member countries to the extent that such an easing can be expected to be advantageous to the world community as a whole. It follows immediately that the eas- ing has to be of the external constraint pro- vided by liquidity rather than solvency, since at best, an easing of the solvency constraint involves a resource transfer that will leave the donors worse off, while at worst, a belief in endogeneity of the solvency constraint creates moral hazard problems that under- mine the incentive for economic efficiency. Hence, my conception of the principle that should be guiding the Fund's lending policies is that they ease the external liquidity con- straint to the degree that is generally ad- vantageous while preserving the intertem-

The title of my paper implies the following five claims: 1) It is possible for macroeconomic policy to influence exchange rates in a substantive way; 2) It is desirable that macroeconomic policy target the exchange rate; 3) It is nevertheless desirable to leave substantial latitude for exchange rates to fluctuate around their target levels; 4) The target should be a real rather than nominal exchange rate; 5) The real value of the dollar was broadly appropriate when this paper was written (December 1988). The paper is devoted to explaining the basis for these five propositions.

The essence of the regime of unmanaged floating that prevailed among the major currencies from March 1973 until the Plaza Agreement in 1985 was that the exchange rate was treated as a residual in the process of macroeconomic policy determination. Admittedly there were occasions-such as October 1976 in the case of the pound sterling and October 1978 in the cases of both the U.S. dollar and the Swiss franc-when particular countries became so concerned with a misalignment of their currency that they were forced to abandon benign (or malign) neglect, but such incidents were episodic. Views about a proper or desirable level of the exchange rate played no systematic role in policy formulation. Section I explains why I judge the performance of unmanaged floating to have been unsatisfactory. Section II lists the real social benefits that exchange rate flexibility can afford, which should be preserved by any reformed system. Section III describes the target zone proposal and explains why it would preserve the real benefits of flexibility while overcoming the weaknesses of unmanaged floating. Section IV sketches a possible set of comprehensive principles for policy coordination of which target zones would be one natural element.