Jeffrey F. Jaffe, Gershon Mandelker, The "Fisher Effect" for Risky Assets: An Empirical Investigation, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 31, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the American Finance Association Dallas, Texas December 28-30, 1975 (May, 1976), pp. 447-458
Hot markets, which refer to instances when stocks increase their offering prices to a level greater than average market premiums, have been overlooked in recent academic literature. Thus, this research examines factors which may aid in the prediction of hot issue markets. A sample of unseasoned stock issues offered between January 1, 1960 and October 31, 1970 is compiled, noting the stock's original offering price and their first two months' ending bids. In order to understand overall market performance during this time, data was also collected from the daily Standard & Poor 500 (SP the correlation between new issue premiums and aftermarket performance; the association between the number of monthly new offerings and simultaneous new issue premiums; and finally the correlation between new issue premiums and past market performance. Several implications for investors, issuers, and researchers are presented, as are directions for future research. The findings indicate that a level of predictability exists within the first month's residuals, which has implications for the timing of offerings and new issue purchases. A higher offering price, when compared to a cold issue market's efficient prices, may be obtained by issuers during that first month's issuance. (AKP)
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis200338(4), 721
Financial economists seem to believe that takeovers are partly motivated by the desire to improve poorly performing firms. However, prior empirical evidence in support of this inefficient management hypothesis is rather weak. We provide a detailed re-examination of this hypothesis in a large scale empirical study. We find little evidence that target firms were performing poorly before acquisition, using either operating or stock returns. This result holds both for the sample as a whole and for subsamples of takeovers that are more likely to be disciplinary. We conclude that the conventional view that targets perform poorly is not supported by the data.
Earlier evidence concerning the relation between stock returns and the effects of size and earnings to price ratio (E/P) is not clear-cut. This paper re-examines these two effects with (a) a substantially longer sample period, 1951–1986, (b) data that are reasonably free of survivor biases, (c) both portfolio and seemingly unrelated regression tests, and (d) an emphasis on the important differences between January and other months. Over the entire period, the earnings yield effect is significant in both January and the other eleven months. Conversely, the size effect is significantly negative only in January. We also find evidence of consistently high returns for firms of all sizes with negative earnings.
Earlier evidence concerning the relation between stock returns and the effects of size and earnings to price ratio (E/P) is not clear‐cut. This paper re‐examines these two effects with (a) a substantially longer sample period, 1951–1986, (b) data that are reasonably free of survivor biases, (c) both portfolio and seemingly unrelated regression tests, and (d) an emphasis on the important differences between January and other months. Over the entire period, the earnings yield effect is significant in both January and the other eleven months. Conversely, the size effect is significantly negative only in January. We also find evidence of consistently high returns for firms of all sizes with negative earnings.
Journal of Financial Economics199539(2-3), 295-319open access
This paper examines empirically whether the short-swing rule (Section 16b of the Securities Exchange Act) deters managers from trading before mergers. Since a merger forces the sale of the target's outstanding equity, insider purchases within six months before the merger cannot escape this rule. We examine the 1941–1961 period when no other insider trading laws were enforced. Consistent with 16b's deterrent effect, managers' purchases drop significantly before the announcement. Before completion, the decrease occurs only in the 1941–1955 period. Surprisingly, pre-announcement sales do not decline, even though 16b cannot punish deferral of planned sales.