We develop and test a theory explaining the equilibrium matching of issuers and underwriters. We assume that issuers and underwriters associate by mutual choice, and that underwriter ability and issuer quality are complementary. Our model implies that matching is positive assortative, and that matches are based on firms' and underwriters' relative characteristics at the time of issuance. The model predicts that the market share of top underwriters and their average issue quality varies inversely with issuance volume. Various cross‐sectional patterns in underwriting spreads are consistent with equilibrium matching. We find strong empirical confirmation of our theory.

Barnett's Divisia monetary aggregates were derived to be elements of Diewert's class of superlative quantity index numbers. Relative to aggregation theory, Barnett's resulting monetary aggregates are strictly preferable to the official sum monetary aggregates, since the component monetary assets are not perfect substitutes. Formal empirical tests based on the relevant aggregation-theoretic criteria have likewise uniformly favored the Divisia monetary aggregates. The current article compares the Divisia with the sum monetary aggregates relative to numerous conventional policy-relevant criteria. The Divisia monetary aggregates, especially at high levels of aggregation, usually perform best in these tests.