The dramatic decline in unionization over the last decade is investigated in the context of a supply/demand model of union status determination using data from surveys of workers conducted in 1977 and 1984 along with data from the National Labor Relations Board on representation elections. It is concluded that the decline in unionization since 1977 is accounted for largely by (1) an increase in employer resistance to unionization, probably due to increased product market competitiveness and (2) a decrease in demand for union representation by nonunion workers due to an increase in the satisfaction of nonunion workers with their jobs and a decline in nonunion workers' beliefs that unions are able to improve wages and working conditions.

The efficiency wage model (EWM) has been advanced as an explanation for large and persistent wage differentials. The shirking version of the EWM assumes a trade-off between self-supervision and external supervision. The turnover version assumes turnover is costly to the firm. Variation across firms in the cost of monitoring/shirking or turnover then is hypothesized to account for wage variations across firms for homogeneous workers. Using a new sample of firm data, this paper presents empirical evidence of the trade-off of wage premiums for supervisory intensity and turnover. Little evidence is found to support either version of the EWM.

Recent developments in the theory of strategic bargaining demonstrate how informational asymmetries can lead to prolonged and costly bargaining. These models can be applied to contract negotiations, yielding an economic theory of strikes. To date, however, few empirical tests of these models have been carried out. In this paper, a set of predictions concerning the incidence and unconditional duration of strikes is derived from a simple bargaining model in which the union is uncertain about the firm's future profitability. These predictions are then tested on a micro data set of major U.S. contract negotiations that took place from 1973 to 1977.

Increasing returns from specialized human capital is a powerful force creating a division of labor in the allocation of time and investments in human capital between married men and married women. Moreover, since child care and housework are more effort intensive than leisure and other household activities, married women spend less effort on each hour of market work than married men working the same number of hours. Hence, married women have lower hourly earnings than married men with the same market human capital, and they economize on the effort expended on market work by seeking less demanding jobs. The responsibility of married women for child care and housework has major implications for earnings and occupational differences between men and women.

Affirmative action may be broadly conceived of as pursuing either the goal of reducing discrimination or that of redistributing jobs and earnings. I attempt to infer the ends of affirmative action policy by analyzing the historical record of enforcement. Optimal enforcement strategies are developed for both the antidiscrimination and the earnings redistribution models and then compared with new data on the actual targeting of affirmative action compliance reviews during the late 1970s. I find that establishments with very low proportions of minority or female workers are not significantly more likely to be reviewed, but that white-collar-intensive establishments are more likely to be reviewed. This indicates the shortcomings of the antidiscrimination model in explaining the OFCCP's behavior and suggests the potential usefulness of the earnings redistribution model.

It is a well-known fact that the extent of unionization is less in states with right-to-work (RTW) laws. A framework is developed for determining whether RTW laws actually cause a decrease in the extent of unionization or whether they simply mirror preexisting tastes of workers against unions. A set of empirical tests is proposed that can distinguish between these explanations based on differences between RTW and non-RTW states in the demand for union representation, the supply of union jobs relative to that demand, and the observed union/nonunion wage differential. These tests are implemented using disaggregated data from the Quality of Employment Survey and the Current Population Survey, and a pattern is found that is consistent with the hypothesis that RTW laws simply mirror preexisting preferences against union representation.