Small accounting firms represent important participants in the audit market, yet details of how they operate and develop competencies remain unexplored. Small firms often join forces through accounting associations and networks (AANs), which may help them overcome significant challenges commonly faced by smaller firms. We interview 37 partners from 18 firms representing nine AANs to examine how small firms leverage their AAN membership and to understand the related implications for audit quality. Our findings indicate that small firms acquire needed resources and enhance their market legitimacy through AAN membership; however, the nature and extent to which they do so varies by AAN type. Importantly, we also find that the majority of respondents perceive AAN resources, especially access to expertise, as critical to their firms' audit quality. Our research, informed by a theoretical lens based on resource dependence and legitimacy, enriches existing auditing literature, provides a new perspective for member firms and regulators, and responds to recent calls to understand factors affecting accounting firms' competencies.

Economics challenge the specification of discretionary accrual models. Since rent-seeking firms pursue differentiated business strategies, firms in the same industry experience idiosyncratic shocks due to heterogeneous economic fundamentals and hence have different accrual-generating processes. We present evidence that idiosyncratic shocks are widespread, propagate through multiple years of financial statements, and reduce accrual models' goodness of fit. This not only affects abnormal accrual estimates for the firm experiencing shocks, but also affects measurement of abnormal accruals for other firms in the industry. We show that idiosyncratic shocks not only add noise to abnormal accruals, but can also exacerbate bias in both unsigned and signed abnormal accruals. We propose ways to reduce accrual model misspecification.

We find that auditors of more conservative clients charge lower fees, issue fewer going concern opinions, and resign less frequently, consistent with more conservative clients imposing less engagement risk on their auditors. Using path analysis, we find evidence that both inherent risk and auditor business risk explain these associations. Also consistent with conservatism reducing auditor business risk, we find that client conservatism is associated with fewer lawsuits against auditors and with fewer client restatements. Taken together, our results are consistent with auditors viewing client conservatism as an important determinant of engagement risk that, in turn, affects auditor-client contracting decisions. Our findings should be of interest to auditors who actively manage client risk and to standard-setters who recently dropped conservatism as a desired attribute of financial reporting quality. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources indicated in the text.

The term “audit style” is used to characterize the unique set of internal working rules of each Big 4 audit firm for the implementation of auditing standards and the enforcement of GAAP within their clienteles. Audit style implies that two companies audited by the same Big 4 auditor, subject to the same audit style, are more likely to have comparable earnings than two firms audited by two different Big 4 firms with different styles. By comparable we mean that two firms in the same industry and year will have a more similar accruals and earnings structure. For a sample of U.S. companies for the period 1987 to 2011, we find evidence consistent with audit style increasing the comparability of reported earnings within a Big 4 auditor's clientele. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from the sources identified in the text.

We extend research on the determinants of corporate tax avoidance to include the role of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) monitoring. Our evidence from large samples implies that U.S. public firms undertake less aggressive tax positions when tax enforcement is stricter. Reflecting its first-order economic impact on firms, our coefficient estimates imply that raising the probability of an IRS audit from 19 percent (the 25th percentile in our data) to 37 percent (the 75th percentile) increases their cash effective tax rates, on average, by nearly two percentage points, which amounts to a 7 percent increase in cash effective tax rates. These results are robust to controlling for firm size and time, which determine our primary proxy for IRS enforcement, in different ways; specifying several alternative dependent and test variables; and confronting potential endogeneity with instrumental variables and panel data estimations, among other techniques.

This study investigates whether individual top executives have incremental effects on their firms’ tax avoidance that cannot be explained by characteristics of the firm. To identify executive effects on firms’ effective tax rates, we construct a data set that tracks the movement of 908 executives across firms over time. Results indicate that individual executives play a significant role in determining the level of tax avoidance that firms undertake. The economic magnitude of the executive effects on tax avoidance is large. Moving between the top and bottom quartiles of executives results in approximately an 11 percent swing in GAAP effective tax rates; thus, executive effects appear to be an important determinant in firms’ tax avoidance.

We develop and describe a new measure of long-run corporate tax avoidance that is based on the ability to pay a low amount of cash taxes per dollar of pre-tax earnings over long time periods. We label this measure the “long-run cash effective tax rate.” We use the long-run cash effective tax rate to examine (1) the extent to which some firms are able to avoid taxes over periods as long as ten years, and (2) how predictive one-year tax rates are for long-run tax avoidance. In our sample of 2,077 firms, we find there is considerable cross-sectional variation in tax avoidance. For example, approximately one-fourth of our sample firms are able to maintain long-run cash effective tax rates below 20 percent, compared to a sample mean tax rate of approximately 30 percent. We also find that annual cash effective tax rates are not very good predictors of long-run cash effective tax rates and, thus, are not accurate proxies for long-run tax avoidance. While there is some evidence of persistence in annual cash effective tax rates, the persistence is asymmetric. Low annual cash effective tax rates are more persistent than are high annual cash effective tax rates. An initial examination of characteristics of firms successful at keeping their cash effective tax rates low over long periods shows that they are well spread across industries but with some clustering.

The Securities and Exchange Commission now requires auditors to review interim earnings reports on a timely basis. Previously, auditors could perform this review retrospectively, as part of the year-end audit. We investigate whether timely reviews are likely to increase the relevance and reliability of reported earnings, as reflected by the extent to which the earnings-return relation is contemporaneous. We find that when the auditor reviews interim earnings on a timely basis, the association between quarterly returns and earnings (and between quarterly returns and unexpected earnings) is predominantly contemporaneous. When the auditor reviews interim earnings retrospectively, however, the association between quarterly returns and earnings is not entirely contemporaneous; with retrospective reviews, returns lead interim earnings. We conclude from these findings that timely reviews increase the likelihood that accounting earnings reflect economic events contemporaneously with returns.

The article presents a report on teaching methods and programmed instructions in the U.S. During the past few years, in the process of continuing search to discover means for increasing instructional efficiency and for developing new materials to cope with the rapidly expanding demands for additional education and training by a burgeoning number of learners, the experimentation and development of programed learning has received the attention of educators and training directors across the country. Programed instruction has found wide-spread usage in industry and in the armed forces in various aspects of training for specific assignments or tasks, in which predetermined performance levels or behavioral patterns had been established. In numerous situations in both education and industry, programed instruction has proved to be effective, and under some circumstances more so than conventional methods. However, at this time research findings, especially at the college level, are totally inadequate to serve as a basis for making decisions on the adoption of programed learning for use throughout any specific course or program.

The path leading to a degree with a major in accounting is a rugged one at best. Obstacles are to be encountered at every turn. Many an eager student has dashed confidently down this path only abruptly to encounter a sizeable obstacle known as partnership dissolution resulting from the admission of a new partner. Managerial Accounting as a course of study represents a recent addition to the accounting curriculum of many schools of higher education. The addition of this course reflects the current demand for an approach to accounting that emphasizes the utilization of accounting data for management planning and control. At the present time many accounting departments are in the process of reevaluating their entire accounting curriculum to determine to what extent present offerings may continue to serve their traditional purpose as well as fulfill the need for an approach which takes into greater consideration the managerial aspect. The non-accounting major terminates his study of accounting with the Managerial Accounting course. The accounting major, almost without exception, takes the same Managerial Accounting course as the non-major which means that he takes the course between Introductory Accounting and Intermediate Accounting.