We examine market efficiency before and after the 1987 Market Crash using the box spread strategy implemented with European-style S&P 500 Index (SPX) options. Before the Crash, apparent arbitrage opportunities were rare and simulated trades were unprofitable assuming a one-minute execution delay. After the Crash, apparent arbitrage opportunities were frequent and simulated trades were profitable even assuming a five-minute execution delay. Our analysis makes the routine assumption that quotes are good until updated to construct a time series of prevailing quotes sampled at 30-second intervals. If this assumption is valid, then arbitrage profits were actually available. If this assumption is invalid, then such profits could have been illusory. Either scenario, however, implies that SPX market efficiency decreased following the Crash—prevailing price quotes repeatedly failed to satisfy the fundamental parity relation underlying the box spread.

This article estimates the effects of changes in pension plans and social security in the 1970s and 1980s on the steady state retirement of men. Work incentives associated with pension coverage and plan characteristics are calculated primarily from the 1969–79 Retirement History Study and the 1983 and 1989 Surveys of Consumer Finances. Simulations with a structural retirement model suggest that the long‐run effects of changes in pension plans and social security account for about a quarter of the reduction in full‐time work by men in their early sixties but cannot explain the reduction by those age 65.

There is evidence of a relation between numeracy and wealth held outside of pensions and Social Security. With pensions and Social Security accounting for half of wealth at retirement, and evidence that those with pensions save more in other forms, one would expect to find knowledge of pensions and Social Security influencing retirement saving. Yet we find no evidence that knowledge of pensions and Social Security is related to nonpension, non-Social Security wealth, to numeracy, or that it plays an intermediate role in the numeracy-wealth relation. Our findings raise questions about policies that would enhance numeracy to increase retirement saving.

Both debt covenants and federal monitoring restrict banks’ discretion. We examine whether banks substituted monitoring for covenants by investigating debt issues of 105 banks between 1979 and 1984, a period when monitoring increased. We hypothesize that bank shareholders take advantage of the intersection between debt covenants and regulatory monitoring to reduce agency costs. We find a decrease in the number of debt issues containing such covenants and the total debt subject to such covenants. We find no such decrease during the same period for a sample of non-banking firms, or for banks during a subsequent period.

The article reviews the book "Auditing Concepts and Methods," by John J. Willingham and D. R. Carmichael.

The article reviews the book "Accounting Principles for Midmanagement," by Dale L. Flesher and T. K. Flesher.

We test whether the conversion price (ratio) is viewed by the stock market as a credible signal of the firm's future earnings prospects (Kim (1990)) and, subsequently, whether convertible debt serves as backdoor equity financing (Stein (1992)). Examining the conversion price in relation to current stock prices and a priori growth expectations produces an average expected time of less than 1.5 years for convertible bonds to be at-the-money. Thus, as Stein suggests, convertibles appear to be a method of drawing equity into a firm's capital structure. We also find that the size of the firm's announcement period abnormal returns is positively related to the expected time for the convertible to become at-the-money. Given these relationships, we conclude that convertible debt issue announcements, on average, send an equity-like signal to the market.