ABSTRACT Agents often inflate measured performance by distorting operating decisions (e.g., real earnings management) and/or reporting decisions (e.g., accruals management). Across four studies, we find that public judgments of distortion’s acceptability largely reflect assessments of how harmful and norm-violating the distortion is. Judgments of operating distortion primarily reflect assessments of harm, whereas judgments of reporting distortion primarily reflect assessments of norm violation. These results are consistent with the Theory of Dyadic Morality (Gray, Waytz, and Young 2012; Schein and Gray 2018). We also find that those who perceive an accounting system as more unfairly withholding an agent’s bonus assess distortion (especially reporting distortion) to be less norm-violating. Those who perceive the performance measure as less appropriate for capturing the value of performance to stakeholders assess distortion (especially operating distortion) to be more harmful. Assessments of distortions’ harm and norm violation explain a substantial portion of the variation in acceptability judgments.

ABSTRACT We predict that a firm's greater accounting comparability with its industry peers facilitates its learning from those peer firms' research and development (R&D) investments, allowing that firm to have greater innovative efficiency. We estimate accounting comparability using pro forma capitalized R&D earnings that link lagged R&D expenditures to future profitability employing the Almon (1965) distributed lag model. We find that greater accounting comparability leads to enhanced ability to predict future cash flows generated by R&D investments of peer firms. In the cross-section, we observe that the relation between accounting comparability and innovative efficiency is stronger if peer firms exhibit higher accounting (accrual) quality and are themselves successful innovators. In sum, this study shows that a shared qualitative characteristic of accounting, namely, accounting comparability, is positively associated with innovative efficiency. JEL Classifications: G12; G14; O32.

ABSTRACT Despite the importance placed on professional skepticism by the accounting profession and regulators, the failure of auditors to exercise an appropriate level of skepticism continues to be a global issue. We experimentally test a potential barrier to skepticism. We find that outcome knowledge biases supervisors' evaluations of skeptical behavior. Holding a staff member's skeptical judgments and acts constant, superiors on the engagement team evaluate the staff's skeptical behavior based on whether the staff's investigation of an issue ultimately identifies a misstatement. Our evidence suggests that evaluators penalize auditors who employ an appropriate level of skepticism, but do not identify a misstatement. Although consultation with their superiors while exercising skepticism improved staff auditors' performance evaluations, consultation did not effectively mitigate the outcome effect on their evaluations. Last, we observe that auditors in the field anticipate that their superiors will be influenced by outcome knowledge when they evaluate their skeptical behavior. Collectively, our results depict an evaluation system that may inadvertently discourage skepticism among auditors in the field. Data Availability: Contact the authors.

To deter financial misstatements, many companies have recently adopted compensation recovery policies—commonly known as ‘‘clawbacks’’—that authorize the board to recoup compensation paid to executives based on misstated financial reports. Clawbacks have been shown to reduce financial misstatements and increase investors’ confidence on earnings information. We show that the benefits come with an unintended consequence of certain firms substituting for accruals management with real transactions management (e.g., reduce research and development [R&D] expenditures), especially firms with strong incentives to achieve short-term earnings targets, such as firms with high growth or high transient institutional ownership. As such, the total amount of earnings management does not decrease subsequent to clawback adoption. We further show that although real transactions management temporarily boosts those clawback adopters’ short-term profitability and stock performance, this trend reverses after three years. In summary, clawbacks may have unexpected effects for a subset of firms whose managers are under greater pressure to meet earnings goals.

ABSTRACT We examine whether audit quality affects the trade-off between accrual-based and real earnings management. We hypothesize that firms motivated to manage earnings per share (EPS) to meet or beat consensus analysts' forecasts are more likely to engage in accretive stock repurchases (a form of real earnings management) when their ability to manage earnings through accruals is constrained by high audit quality. We find that firms with high audit quality are more likely to use accretive stock repurchases and less likely to use accrual-based earnings management to meet or beat consensus analysts' forecasts. Our results are robust to various controls for endogeneity concerns.

There is a large literature on semiparametric estimation of average treatment effects under unconfounded treatment assignment in settings with a fixed number of covariates. More recently attention has focused on settings with a large number of covariates. In this paper we extend lessons from the earlier literature to this new setting. We propose that in addition to reporting point estimates and standard errors, researchers report results from a number of supplementary analyses to assist in assessing the credibility of their estimates.

The dynamics of a linear (or linearized) dynamic stochastic economic model can be expressed in terms of matrices (A, B, C, D) that define a state space system for a vector of observables. An associated state space system (A, ^ B,C, ^D) determines a vector autoregression for those same observables. We present a simple condition for checking when these two state space systems match up and when they do not when there are equal numbers of economic and VAR shocks. We illustrate our condition with a permanent income example. (JEL C32, E32)

This paper provides empirical evidence about the effect of unearned income on earnings, consumption, and savings. Using an original survey of people playing the lottery in Massachusetts in the mid-1980's, we analyze the effects of the magnitude of lottery prizes on economic behavior. The critical assumption is that among lottery winners the magnitude of the prize is randomly assigned. We find that unearned income reduces labor earnings, with a marginal propensity to consume leisure of approximately 11 percent, with larger effects for individuals between 55 and 65 years old. After receiving about half their prize, individuals saved about 16 percent. (JEL C81, D12, E21, J22, J26)

ABSTRACT We examine the role of borrower concerns about future credit availability in mitigating the effects of adverse selection and income misrepresentation in the mortgage market. We show that the majority of additional risk associated with “low‐doc” mortgages originated prior to the Great Recession was due to adverse selection on the part of borrowers who could verify income but chose not to. We provide novel evidence that these borrowers were more likely to inflate or exaggerate their income. Our analysis suggests that recent regulatory changes that have essentially eliminated the low‐doc loan product would result in credit rationing against self‐employed borrowers.

ABSTRACT Using a sample of U.S. dual‐class companies, we examine how divergence between insider voting and cash flow rights affects managerial extraction of private benefits of control. We find that as this divergence widens, corporate cash holdings are worth less to outside shareholders, CEOs receive higher compensation, managers make shareholder value‐destroying acquisitions more often, and capital expenditures contribute less to shareholder value. These findings support the agency hypothesis that managers with greater excess control rights over cash flow rights are more prone to pursue private benefits at shareholders’ expense, and help explain why firm value is decreasing in insider excess control rights.