Knowledge that Transforms

A substantial literature has developed to estimate the “true” cyclicality of real wages, that is, composition bias free. Two major issues are addressed in this article: aggregation of heterogeneous workers and potential bias in the measurement of the labor input. A general analysis of the biases is presented, and alternative approaches in the literature are nested in a single framework. Estimates based on an efficiency units concept that avoids the usual aggregation problems are presented. Composition bias underestimates the usual parameters of interest unless both the price and the quantity of the labor input are adjusted appropriately.

While much empirical research exists on labor market consequences of unemployment benefits, there is remarkably little evidence on the forces determining benefits. We present a simple model where workers desire insurance against unemployment risk and benefits increase the unemployment rate. We then conduct one of the first empirical analyses of the determinants of the parameters of the benefit system. Using data for developed countries for 1971–89, controlling for year and country fixed effects and the government's political color, we find evidence that the level of benefits falls when the unemployment rate is high. This is consistent with Wright's tax effect.

This article presents evidence on the relationship between compensation ratios and spans of control within hierarchical organizations. We find that compensation ratios are lower than span of control at any position within the hierarchy, which is consistent with an elasticity of compensation to a number of subordinates lower than one. Managers’ human capital endowments determine a significant part of the salary differences throughout hierarchical levels, as predicted by models of talent allocation in hierarchies. Differences in the size of firms should be attributed more to differences in their number of hierarchical levels than to variations in the span of control.

This article develops a model in which quit rates, and thus the income distribution, depend on employee perceptions of the accuracy of employer assessments of individual productivity because these latter assessments affect wages. When employees believe that these assessments are accurate, income inequality tends to be high. The model can account for the negative correlation across some countries of inequality and the extent to which inequality is deemed to be excessive. It also fits the contrast in U.S. and French experiences concerning the tenure of highly educated workers with high wages relative to the tenure of lower‐paid workers.

I argue for increased reliance on non–U.S. data and policy evaluations to understand basic labor market parameters and to predict the effects of changes in U.S. labor market policies. Foreign experiences generate exogenous shocks to labor costs that create unusual opportunities to measure impacts on labor demand. Foreign policies often provide more variation in the underlying parameters in systems that are often structured like their American counterparts. Foreign data sets are often larger and better suited to inferring behavior. An empirical examination shows the effect of author's location, data set, and journal on the research's subsequent impact.

This article extends the research on school quality by focusing on the structural effects of high school quality on earnings. I specify a model of college choice and earnings determination that captures two separate effects of school quality on earnings. First, school quality affects a high school student's choice of college. College choice, in turn, affects the individual's postschool earnings. Second, the additional skills accumulated via a higher quality high school directly influence wages. The results suggest that high school quality influences earnings by affecting college choice behavior, while the direct effect of school quality on earnings is less evident.

The shirking model of efficiency wages has been thought to imply that monitoring and pay are substitute instruments for motivating workers. We demonstrate that this result is not generally true. As monitoring becomes cheaper, a given effort level will be implemented with more monitoring and less pay, but it is typically also optimal to implement a higher effort. The article provides conditions under which the latter “scale effect” dominates the former “substitution effect” and vice versa. If the ease of monitoring varies across occupations, the model predicts a nonmonotonic relationship between the wage level and workers’ rents.

We examine corporate spinoffs as events through which top management is restructured. Our main findings are: (1) firm‐specific human capital and human capital, in the form of governance expertise and top management experience, affect the composition of spinoff firms’ top management; (2) spinoff top management structure is related to the value created by a spinoff; and (3), for a subsample of firms, spinoffs serve as a form of management dismissal, with the opportunity to manage a smaller, weaker spinoff firm serving as a “consolation prize.”

We present an explanation for the persistence of gender segregation in occupations and for the observed cross‐country differences in its extent. Agents have imperfect information about their probability of success in different occupations and base their career choices on prior beliefs about these probabilities. Beliefs are updated according to Bayes's rule, implying that past differences in preferences over occupations across genders affect the beliefs of the current generation. Consequently, even when men and women become identical in their preferences, their career choices differ. Moreover, the way in which preferences change is shown to affect the degree of segregation.

We organize an empirical analysis of Russian wage arrears around hypotheses concerning incentives for firms to pay late and for workers to tolerate late payment. Nationally representative household panel data matched with employer data show that arrears are positively related to firm age, size, state ownership, and declining performance. Constrained multinomial logit estimates reveal intrafirm variation related to job tenure and small shareholdings in the firm. Wage arrears, unlike wage cuts, have a theoretically ambiguous effect on workers' quit behavior, and we show empirically that the effect varies negatively with the extent of the practice in the local labor market.