Inventories, LIFO, Inventories orders, Tax liabilities

Modigliani and Cohn hypothesize that the stock market suffers from money illusion, discounting real cash flows at nominal discount rates. While previous research has focused on the pricing of the aggregate stock market relative to Treasury bills, the money-illusion hypothesis also has implications for the pricing of risky stocks relative to safe stocks. Simultaneously examining the pricing of Treasury bills, safe stocks, and risky stocks allows us to distinguish money illusion from any change in the attitudes of investors toward risk. Our empirical results support the hypothesis that the stock market suffers from money illusion.

I. The concept of seigniorage, 495. — II. Its practical significance in the British case, 496. — III. The gross seigniorage gain from sterling, 498. — IV. The offsetting interest cost of the sterling balances, 502.

Using firm data disaggregated by industry, the authors establish a set of regularities in the distribution of firm R&D intensities within manufacturing industries. The authors show how a simple probabilistic process, in which change influences a key unobserved determinant of R&D and firm size conditions the returns to R&D, can account for these regularities and other features of the distributions. The model provides a unified, noncausal explanation of a series of long-observed relationships across mean R&D intensity, market concentration, and the coefficient of variation. It also offers a novel explanation for the inverse relationship between R&D productivity and firm size.

Using firm data disaggregated by industry, we establish a set of regularities in the distribution of firm R&D intensities within manufacturing industries. We show how a simple probabilistic process, in which chance influences a key unobserved determinant of R&D and firm size conditions the returns to R&D, can account for these regularities and other features of the distributions. The model provides a unified, noncausal explanation of a series of long-observed relationships across mean R&D intensity, market concentration, and the coefficient of variation. It also offers a novel explanation for the inverse relationship between R&D productivity and firm size.

We provide novel evidence suggestive of insider trading through concealed relationships identified using information from over 100,000 Facebook profiles and their 35 million friends. Focusing on connections between fund managers and firm officers, we demonstrate that hidden ties are linked to substantial abnormal returns averaging 135 basis points per month (exceeding 16% alpha annually, t -stat = 3.54) across the universe of mutual funds and public firms. These hidden ties emerge as the most powerful predictor of future stock returns among documented network characteristics, with predictive power increasing over time through the present day. The premium associated with such connections arises not from endogenous selection or familiarity bias; instead, fund managers exhibit specific timing ability in deciding when to hold (or avoid) stocks of firm officers linked through hidden ties. The value of trading information rises with the degree of concealment and is concentrated around earnings and M&A events. The premium is absent in index funds, where strategic stock selection and timing are infeasible. Our findings on the value of hidden ties remain robust across industries, investment styles, time periods, and firm types.

We examine the relationship between ownership structure and corporate crime. Our approach draws upon two lines of research: (1) the theory of the firm which poses ownership as a critical incentive mechanism and (2) the economic theory of corporate crime, which emphasizes the role played by top management in affecting crime in the corporation. We find that crime occurs less frequently among firms in which management has a larger ownership stake. Our results imply that penalizing `corporations' (shareholders) deters crime, and that corporate crime tends not to benefit shareholders, ex ante. Rather than being something shareholders have encouraged, corporate crime appears to reflect an agency cost limited but not optimally eliminated through the costly efforts of top management. The evidence is consistent with the notion that ownership structure plays an important role in aligning the hidden actions of top management with the shareholder interest.