Knowledge that Transforms

This paper discusses how economists' views of firms' financial structure decisions have evolved from treating firms' profitability as given; to acknowledging that managerial actions affect profitability; to recognizing that firm value depends on the allocation of decision or control rights. The paper argues that the decision or control rights approach is useful, even though it is at an early stage of development, and that the approach has some empirical content: it can throw light on the structure of venture capital contracts and the reasons for the diversity of claims.

The internet is bringing profound changes in scholarly publishing. The American Economic Association maintains a web site ( www.AEAweb.org ) containing the three AEA journals, bibliographic information, links to various economics information, and various services for AEA members. This note surveys the AEA's on-line initiatives.

During the Progressive Era at the beginning of the 20 th century, the United States replaced litigation by regulation as the principal mechanism of social control of business. To explain why this happened, we present a model of choice of law enforcement strategy between litigation and regulation based on the idea that justice can be subverted with sufficient expenditure of resources. The model suggests that courts are more vulnerable to subversion than regulators, especially in an environment of significant inequality of wealth and political power. The switch to regulation can then be seen as an efficient response to the subversion of justice by robber barons during the Gilded Age. The model makes sense of the progressive reform agenda, and of the successes and failures of alternative law enforcement strategies in different countries.

E BEGAN to conceptualize average total cost functions during the early decades of the twentieth century. But a century before, a German music publishing firm calculated and used in its internal decision making output-dependent average cost estimates for two methods of printing sheet music. This note describes that early experience and juxtaposes against it the relatively late emergence of the ATC curve in the formal literature of economics.

This article reviews Monetary Policy Rules, edited by John Taylor. The book evaluates the Taylor rule, a policy rule that specifies changes in the central bank's interest rate according to what is happening to two variables, real output and inflation. Questions are raised about (a) how well the models fit the data; (b) the validity of the assumption that there has been clear improvement in monetary policy; and (c) the rule's microfoundations.

The Demography of Corporations and Industries (2000) by Glenn R. Carroll and T. Michael Hannan is a welcome addition to a body of empirical analysis of firms and industries that studies the effects of technological change and other changes that occur over time. The book contains a wealth of facts, and some new insights too. It will make useful secondary reading in some graduate courses in economics, and I would recommend it to anyone whose research relates to the concept of creative destruction.

Here is how the 1817 Ricardo comparative advantage trade benefit analysis has to be modified to take account of post-1960 Sraffian benefits from capital-using technologies. By bringing J. S. Mill's demand model up to date in terms of its implicit geometric-mean money-metric utility, specific measurements for real net national product are calculated to partition sources of welfare gains (from output enhancements and taste-preference accommodations) in scenarios of (1) trade between equals, (2) trade between poor and rich nations, and (3) for biased inventions that enable a poor country to take over production of items in which formerly the rich place enjoyed comparative advantage. History of economic doctrine is mined to advance today's frontier of scientific knowledge—a forward-looking function for “Whig history.”

In The Mystery of Capital, Hernando de Soto promotes his explanation of why formal capital markets function poorly in developing countries. De Soto argues that much of the population of developing countries lacks access to credit, not because they lack assets, but because ownership of their property is secured informally, which prevents the use of property as collateral. The inability to convert assets into capital keeps the developing world from benefiting from capitalism.

From the perspective of the Walrasian general equilibrium model, entrepreneurial and opportunistic behavior seems foreign. Can the model be refashioned so that it can accommodate such behavior? Many would say no, but we argue the contrary. Indeed, we present a reformulation of the model that serves as a gateway to, rather than a detour from, such contemporary issues as innovation and incentives. The trick is to reexamine what perfect competition means. Starting with an historical summary of general equilibrium, we sketch an image of the perfect competitor as an active market opportunist, seeking out profit potentials wherever he can.

Financial and real investment flexibility, tax competition, and superior economic information by transnationals both create a rationale for corporate income taxation and limit the effectiveness of such taxation. While these factors have led to a variety of transnational tax policies, such as deferral, double taxation, apportionment, and trade rules, very few of these institutional features have been integrated into tax competition and agency models. In this paper, I show how the integration of investment flexibility, tax competition, and agency issues is crucial to our understanding of corporate tax policies.