Knowledge that Transforms

The last fifteen years have seen an explosion of contributions in the field of political economy. Two new books, Political Economy in Macroeconomics by Allan Drazen and Political Economy: Explaining Economic Policy by Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, organize this literature and evaluate what has been learned. Drazen mostly focuses on applications for macroeconomic policy, while Persson and Tabellini focus on the various tools that can be used to analyze the political process, and the institutional details of decision-making.

Statistical and programming techniques are used to examine economics department quality rankings and how resources and research output are related. Four questions are asked using the National Research Council's 1993 survey. Are there significant differences in department quality scores? How are quality scores related to publications, citations and numbers of Ph.D.s produced? What is the relation between research output and department resources? How well do departments generate research in comparison with other departments with similar levels of resources? What I find is that resources determine outputs, outputs determine opinions (which are generally diffuse) and most departments efficiently use their resources.

Natural resources, by their nature, are not readily bent to the status of private property. Efficient resource use is complicated by jurisdictional externalities, public goods, non-use values, and beneficiaries spatially separated from the location of resources. The task is made more challenging by ecological complexity that obscures cause (benefits) and effects (costs), and dramatic time lags between individual actions and subsequent social consequences that, together with substantial uncertainty, introduce the chance of irreversibilities. Resource economists have played a major role in the literature on externalities, the development of individual transferable quotas, non-market valuation techniques and common property management.

Economists were among the many scholars uprooted following Hitler's rise to power in 1933. This article reviews a series of books edited by Harald Hagemann and others which provide extensive biographical information on 314 German-speaking economists whose professional opportunities were shattered by Nazi policies. It evaluates the impact of the massive emigration on economic research and teaching in Germany and Austria and in the nations to which most of the economists emigrated. An analysis of 1966-70 data reveals that the emigres' cited publication counts were equivalent to the citations of three leading U.S. economics departments.

This paper begins by systematically developing the “static” theory of preferential trade areas (PTAs) and showing that neither a large volume of initial intra-union trade nor geographical proximity can serve as a guide to welfare enhancing PTAs. The paper then discusses the modern literature addressing welfare effects of simultaneous division of the world into many PTAs, the impact of the decision to form a PTA on external tariffs and the “dynamic” time-path question of whether PTAs are building blocks or stumbling blocks towards multilateral freeing of trade. A final section discusses key theoretical considerations in the empirical evaluation of PTAs.

The recent literature exploiting natural events as “natural experiment” instruments is reviewed to assess to what extent it has advanced empirical knowledge. A weakness of the studies that adopt this approach is that the necessary set of behavioral, market, and technological assumptions made by the authors in justifying their interpretations of the estimates is often absent. The methodology and findings from twenty studies are summarized and simple economic models are used to elucidate the implicit assumptions made by the authors and to demonstrate the sensitivity of the interpretations of the findings to the relaxation of some of these assumptions.

This article surveys the theory of the public enforcement of law—the use of public agents (inspectors, tax auditors, police, prosecutors) to detect and to sanction violators of legal rules. We first present the basic elements of the theory, focusing on the probability of imposition of sanctions, the magnitude and form of sanctions, and the rule of liability. We then examine a variety of extensions of the central theory, concerning accidental harms, costs of imposing fines, errors, general enforcement, marginal deterrence, the principal-agent relationship, settlements, self-reporting, repeat offenders, imperfect knowledge about the probability and magnitude of fines, and incapacitation.

The manufacturing sectors of developing countries have traditionally been relatively protected. They have also been subject to heavy regulation, much of which has favored large firms. Accordingly, it is often argued that in these countries: (1) markets tolerate inefficient firms, so cross-firm productivity dispersion is high; (2) small groups of entrenched oligopolists exploit monopoly power in product markets; and (3) many small firms are unable or unwilling to grow, so important scale economies go unexploited. Drawing on plant and firm level studies, I assess each of these conjectures and find none to be systematically supported. However, many open issues remain.

This paper reviews research that uses longitudinal microdata to document productivity movements and to examine factors behind productivity growth. The research explores the dispersion of productivity across firms and establishments, the persistence of productivity differentials, the consequences of entry and exit, and the contribution of resource reallocation across firms to aggregate productivity growth. The research also reveals important factors correlated with productivity growth, such as managerial ability, technology use, human capital, and regulation. The more advanced literature in the field has begun to address the more difficult questions of the causality between these factors and productivity growth.