This study examines the relation between audit quality and earnings management. Consistent with prior research, we treat audit quality as a dichotomous variable and assume that Big Six auditors are of higher quality than non‐Big Six auditors. Earnings management is captured by discretionary accruals that are estimated using a cross‐sectional version of the Jones 1991 model. Prior literature suggests that auditors are more likely to object to management's accounting choices that increase earnings (as opposed to decrease earnings) and that auditors are more likely to be sued when they are associated with financial statements that overstate earnings (as compared to understate earnings). Therefore, we hypothesize that clients of non‐Big Six auditors report discretionary accruals that increase income relatively more than the discretionary accruals reported by clients of Big Six auditors. This hypothesis is supported by evidence from a sample of 10,379 Big Six and 2,179 non‐Big Six firm years. Specifically, clients of non‐Big Six auditors report discretionary accruals that are, on average, 1.5‐2.1 percent of total assets higher than the discretionary accruals reported by clients of Big Six auditors. Also, consistent with earnings management, we find that the mean and median of the absolute value of discretionary accruals are greater for firms with non‐Big Six auditors. This result also indicates that lower audit quality is associated with more “accounting flexibility

Issuers of initial public offerings (IPOs) can report earnings in excess of cash flows by taking positive accruals. This paper provides evidence that issuers with unusually high accruals in the IPO year experience poor stock return performance in the three years thereafter. IPO issuers in the most “aggressive” quartile of earnings managers have a three-year aftermarket stock return of approximately 20 percent less than IPO issuers in the most “conservative” quartile. They also issue about 20 percent fewer seasoned equity offerings. These differences are statistically and economically significant in a variety of specifications

Issuers of initial public offerings (IPOs) can report earnings in excess of cash flows by taking positive accruals. This paper provides evidence that issuers with unusually high accruals in the IPO year experience poor stock return performance in the three years thereafter. IPO issuers in the most “aggressive” quartile of earnings managers have a three‐year aftermarket stock return of approximately 20 percent less than IPO issuers in the most “conservative” quartile. They also issue about 20 percent fewer seasoned equity offerings. These differences are statistically and economically significant in a variety of specifications

Recent studies document that firms conducting seasoned equity offerings experience poor stock price and earnings performance in the post-offering period. I investigate whether earnings management around the time of the offering can explain a portion of the poor performance. Consistent with this explanation, I show that earnings management during the year around the offering predicts both earnings changes and market-adjusted stock returns in the following year. These findings suggest that the stock market temporarily overvalues issuing firms and is subsequently disappointed by predictable declines in earnings caused by earnings management

Taxation, Book-Tax conformity , IRS, Earnings management

[This study investigates whether firms that expect increases in earnings resulting from sudden product price increases use accounting accruals to reduce earnings and, thus, political sensitivity. Specifically, oil firms' accruals are analyzed in a period of rapid gasoline price increases during the 1990 Persian Gulf crisis. Our results show that oil firms that expected to profit from the crisis used accruals to reduce their reported quarterly earnings during the Gulf crisis. In contrast to previous research, we find that the tendency to release good earnings news early, documented in prior research, is reversed for oil firms during the Gulf crisis. This finding suggests that the benefit of disclosing "good news" (i.e., earnings increases) early may have been out-weighed by the political costs associated with timely releases of the information

This study investigates whether firms that expect increases in earnings resulting from sudden product price increases use accounting accruals to reduce earnings and, thus, political sensitivity. Specifically, oil firms' accruals are analyzed in a period of rapid gasoline price increases during the 1990 Persian Gulf crisis. Our results show that oil firms that expected to profit from the crisis used accruals to reduce their reported quarterly earnings during the Gulf crisis. In contrast to previous research, we find that the tendency to release good earnings news early, documented in prior research, is reversed for oil firms during the Gulf crisis. This finding suggests that the benefit of disclosing "good news" (i.e., earnings increases) early may have been outweighed by the political costs associated with timely releases of the information

Unlike other investments in the U.S., research and development budgets are not depreciated but expensed. Thus, pre-tax reported earnings fluctuate dollar-for-dollar with changes in R&D budgets. Because executives know more about the firm than outsiders, they may adjust R&D budgets in order to manage accounting earnings and stock prices. Discretionary changes in R&D may also reflect managerial incentives, taxes, and free cash flow. We study a panel of 100 U.S. companies with large R&D budgets for the decade between 1977 and 1986. On average, R&D budget adjustments reduce the anticipated gap between analysts' earnings forecasts and reported income. In the cross-section of firms, more gap closure is associated with high trading volume and high business risk. Less earnings management occurs if the CEO and institutional investors own an important fraction of the shares

[This paper explores the determinants of the valuation allowance for deferred tax assets under SFAS No. 109. We find that, consistent with SFAS No. 109, the allowance is larger for firms with relatively more deferred tax assets and smaller for firms with higher levels of expected future taxable income. The most important explanatory variable for the valuation allowance is the level of firms' tax credit and tax loss carryforwards, consistent with these items being more difficult to realize. We find little evidence that managers use the valuation allowance for earnings management purposes, although these tests may not be very powerful