We empirically evaluate the predictions of the mispricing hypothesis with limits-to-arbitrage suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and the q-theory with investment frictions proposed by Li and Zhang (2010) on the negative relation between asset growth and average stock returns. We conduct cross-sectional regressions of returns on asset growth on subsamples split by a given measure of limits-to-arbitrage or investment frictions. We show that: (i) proxies for limits-to-arbitrage and proxies for investment frictions are often highly correlated; (ii) the evidence based on equal-weighted returns shows significant support for both hypotheses, while the evidence from value-weighted returns is weaker; and (iii) in direct comparisons, each hypothesis is supported by a fair and similar amount of evidence

During a financial crisis, when investors are most in need of liquidity and accurate prices, hedge funds cut their arbitrage positions and hoard cash. The paper explains this phenomenon. We argue that the fragile nature of the capital structure of hedge funds, combined with low market liquidity, creates a risk of coordination in redemptions among hedge fund investors that severely limits hedge funds' arbitrage capabilities. We present a model of hedge funds' optimal asset allocation in the presence of coordination risk among investors. We show that hedge fund managers behave conservatively and even abstain from participating in the market once coordination risk is factored into their investment decisions. The model suggests a new source of limits to arbitrage

The returns and stock holdings of institutional investors from 1980 to 2007 provide little evidence of stock-picking skill. Institutions as a whole closely mimic the market portfolio, with pre-cost returns that have nearly perfect correlation with the value-weighted index and an insignificant CAPM alpha of 0.08% quarterly. Institutions also show little tendency to bet on any of the main characteristics known to predict stock returns, such as book-to-market, momentum, or accruals. While particular groups of institutions have modest stock-picking skill relative to the CAPM, their performance is almost entirely explained by the book-to-market and momentum effects in returns. Further, no group holds a portfolio that deviates efficiently from the market portfolio.

We examine whether the post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD) varies cross-sectionally with short-horizon return predictability from order flows, which characterizes the information environment and reflects the extent to which information is efficiently impounded in prices. We first demonstrate that this proxy for market efficiency (developed by Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam 2008) captures the degree of market frictions that limit arbitrage activities. We then present evidence that the inverse of short-horizon return predictability is negatively associated with the PEAD and remains statistically and economically significant after controlling for a wide range of explanatory variables used in prior research. Finally, although we find that profits of implementing the PEAD trading strategy are significantly reduced by transaction costs, we demonstrate that profits continue to remain statistically and economically significant for the less efficient firms that face otherwise higher barriers to arbitrage. Our results indicate that short-horizon return predictability from order flows better explains stock returns after earnings announcements

The recent credit crisis has highlighted the importance of market liquidity and its interaction with the price of credit risk. We investigate this interaction by relating the liquidity of corporate bonds to the basis between the credit default swap (CDS) spread of the issuer and the par-equivalent bond yield spread. The liquidity of a bond is measured using a recently developed measure called latent liquidity , which is defined as the weighted average turnover of funds holding the bond, where the weights are their fractional holdings of the bond. We find that bonds with higher latent liquidity are more expensive relative to their CDS contracts after controlling for other realized measures of liquidity. Analysis of interaction effects shows that highly illiquid bonds of firms with a greater degree of uncertainty are also expensive, consistent with limits to arbitrage between CDS and bond markets, due to the higher costs of “shorting” illiquid bonds. Additionally, we document the positive effects of liquidity in the CDS market on the CDS-bond basis. We also find that several firm- and bond-level variables related to credit risk affect the basis, indicating that the CDS spread does not fully capture the credit risk of the bond