We model the interaction between product market competition and internal governance at firms. Competition makes it more difficult to infer a manager’s action given the realized output, thus increasing the cost of inducing effort. An exogenous change in the incentive to shirk increases managerial slack. However, the effects on firm value are ambiguous; in particular, firm value can increase as slack increases. As a result, empirical tests that focus on changes in value may not capture changes in the level of slack. We also provide conditions under which increased competition leads all firms to switch from high to low effort.

The 2007–9 financial crisis began with increased uncertainty over funding conditions in money markets. We show that funding uncertainty can explain diverse elements of commercial banks’ behavior during the crisis, including: (i) reductions in lending volumes, balance sheets, and profitability; (ii) more intense competition for retail deposits (including deposits turning into a “loss leader”); (iii) stronger lending cuts by more highly extended banks with a smaller deposit base; (iv) weaker pass-through from changes in the central bank’s policy rate to market interest rates; and (v) a binding “zero lower bound” as well as a rationale for unconventional monetary policy.

We analyze the costs and benefits of clawback provisions that enable firms to recover incentive compensation from top management if financials are restated. In a simple contracting model, we find that a clawback provision effectively lengthens the horizon of incentives and curbs misreporting. However, such a provision can add noise to the underlying performance measure, reducing managerial effort and firm value. Our empirical tests support the model’s predictions regarding which types of firms are likely to voluntarily use clawback provisions. We also document that clawback provisions are associated with higher reporting quality, greater CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity, and higher CEO compensation.

Abstract Previous studies have identified several variables that would have predicted future stock returns, though other studies suggest these results may be due to data snooping. To guard against data snooping, researchers have suggested use of Bayesian model averaging (BMA) to account for the uncertainty about prediction models. In common with other researchers, I find evidence of predictability during time periods when a hypothetical investor uses BMA with no restrictions on what variables may be included in the model. However, when the hypothetical investor is limited to using only variables whose predictive ability would have been known at the time of the forecast, predictability disappears. Moreover, predictability also disappears when data are updated through 2010, even without constraints on variable use. The results cast doubt on whether stock returns were ever predictable in real time and also suggest that returns may no longer be predictable even if real-time constraints are removed.

We study the pricing behaviour of a multiproduct firm, when consumers must pay a search cost to learn its prices. Equilibrium prices are high, because consumers understand that visiting a store exposes them to a hold-up problem. However, a firm with more products charges lower prices, because it attracts consumers who are more price sensitive. Similarly, when a firm advertises a low price on one product, consumers rationally expect it to charge somewhat lower prices on its other products as well. We therefore find that having a large product range, and advertising a low price on one product, are substitute ways of building a “low-price image”. Finally, we show that in a competitive setting each product has a high regular price, with firms occasionally giving random discounts that are positively correlated across products.

This study finds that equity returns in the banking sector in the wake of the Great Recession and the European sovereign debt crisis have been driven mainly by weak growth prospects and heightened sovereign risk; and to a lesser extent by deteriorating funding conditions and investor sentiment. While the equity return performance in the banking sector has been dismal in general, there is some evidence that better capitalized and less leveraged banks have outperformed their peers in times of stress.

We challenge a common presumption that poison pills and two Delaware case rulings in 1995 validating such pills materially entrench firms. Based on unsolicited takeover attempts from 1985 to 2009, we find that poison pills enhance takeover premiums, but do not reduce completion rates. Furthermore, the 1995 Delaware rulings affected neither the use of poison pills among the targets, the effectiveness of the pills that were used, the completion rate of the takeover attempts, nor the takeover premiums.

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