This paper analyzes how electoral incentives affected the performance of a major decentralized conditional cash transfer program intended on reducing school dropout rates among children of poor households in Brazil. We show that while this federal program successfully reduced school dropout by 8 percentage points, the program's impact was 36% larger in municipalities governed by mayors who faced reelection possibilities compared to those with lame-duck mayors. First-term mayors with good program performance were much more likely to be reelected. These mayors adopted program implementation practices that were not only more transparent but also associated with better program outcomes.

We study the effects of the Mexican conditional cash transfer program Progresa on school enrollment and performance in passing grades. We develop a theoretical framework of the dynamics of the educational process including endogeneity and uncertainty of school performance. Using a randomized experiment implemented under Progresa, we identify the effect of the program on enrollment and performance in the first year of the program. We find that the program had a positive impact on school enrollment at all grade levels, whereas for performance it had a positive impact at the primary school level but a negative impact at the secondary level.