Alberto Bisin of New York University reviews “Modeling Social Behavior: Mathematical and Agent-Based Models of Social Dynamics and Cultural Evolution” by Paul E. Smaldino. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Explores ways of thinking about and studying complex social systems using mathematical and computational models, focusing on relatively simple dynamic models to aid in the study of social organisms and what they do together.”

Foragers, Farmers, and Fossil Fuels: How Human Values Evolve is a large-scale history of the world through the different modes of production humanity has adopted over time and their implications in terms of moral values. Morris argues that the predominant value systems of human societies are cultural adaptations to the organizational structures of the societies themselves, their institutions, and ultimately to their modes of production. In particular, the book contains a careful analysis of how the hunting–gathering mode of production induces egalitarian values and relatively favorable attitudes toward violent resolution of conflicts, while farming induces hierarchical values and less favorable attitudes toward violence, and in turn the fossil fuel (that is, industrial) mode of production induces egalitarian values and nonviolent attitudes. The narrative in the book is rich, diverse, and ultimately entertaining. Morris's analysis is very knowledgeable and informative: arguments and evidence are rooted in history, anthropology, archeology, and social sciences in general. Nonetheless, the analysis falls short of being convincing about the causal nature of the existing relationship between modes of production and moral value systems. ( JEL A13, D02, N30, N60, Z13)

Invariably, across a cross-section of countries and time periods, wealth distributions are skewed to the right displaying thick upper tails, that is, large and slowly declining top wealth shares. In this survey, we categorize the theoretical studies on the distribution of wealth in terms of the underlying economic mechanisms generating skewness and thick tails. Further, we show how these mechanisms can be micro-founded by the consumption–savings decisions of rational agents in specific economic and demographic environments. Finally we map the large empirical work on the wealth distribution to its theoretical underpinnings. (JEL C46, D14, D31, E21, J31)

Behavioral economics presents a “paternalistic” rationale for benevolent government intervention. This paper presents a model of public debt where voters have self-control problems and attempt to commit using illiquid assets. In equilibrium, government accumulates debt to respond to individuals' desire to undo their commitments, which leads individuals to rebalance their portfolio, in turn feeding into a demand for further debt accumulation. As a consequence, (i) large (and distortionary) government debt accumulation occurs, and (ii) banning illiquid assets could improve individuals' welfare. These results offer a new rationale for balanced budget rules in constitutions to restrain governments' responses to voters' self-control problems.(JEL D2, D72, D78, H62, H63)

This paper presents an economic analysis of the intergenerational transmission of ethnic and religious traits through family socialization and marital segregation decisions. Frequency of intragroup marriage (homogamy), as well as socialization rates of religious and ethnic groups, depend on the group's share of the population: minority groups search more intensely for homogamous mates, and spend more resources to socialize their offspring. This pattern generally induces a dynamics of the distribution of ethnic and religious traits which converges to a culturally heterogeneous stationary population. Existing empirical evidence bearing directly and indirectly on the implications of the model is discussed.

We provide an abstract model of the interaction between culture and political institutions. The model is designed to study the political economy of elites and civil society on the determination of long-run socioeconomic activity. We characterize conditions such that the cultural traits of elites and civil society and the institutions determining their relative political power complement (substitute) each other, giving rise to a multiplier effect that amplifies (dampens) their combined ability to spur socioeconomic activity. We show how the joint dynamics may display hysteresis and oscillations, depending on the form of the interaction between elites and civil society.

Do Walrasian markets function orderly in the presence of adverse selection? In particular, is their outcome efficient when exclusive contracts are enforceable? This paper addresses these questions in the context of a Rothschild‐Stiglitz insurance economy. We identify an externality associated with the presence of adverse selection as a special form of consumption externality. Consequently, we show that competitive equilibria always exist but are not typically incentive efficient. However, as markets for pollution rights can internalize environmental externalities, markets for consumption rights can be designed to internalize the consumption externality due to adverse selection. With such markets competitive equilibria exist and incentive‐constrained versions of the first and second welfare theorems hold.