The choices of firms raising external capital conform to standard static choice theory in that the higher the (relative) cost of an alternative—both at the overall market level and at the firm level—the less attractive is that alternative. Price elasticities of demand are smaller for more profitable and tangible firms, and larger for larger and more liquid firms. Firm fixed effects account for one-third of the explained choice variation of multiple issuers. Short-term debt is more attractive when the yield curve is steeply sloped, but the demand for equity is inelastic with respect to the market price-earnings multiple.

We find that Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) actions (especially rate cuts) narrowed corporate credit spreads during the pre-crisis period of 2002–07. During the 2008 crisis period, we find that both conventional cuts and quantitative easing decreased spreads. But FOMC inactions caused significant widening of spreads. The effects are especially large for speculative-grade and short-maturity bonds. Overall, the policy uncertainty during the crisis and macroeconomic theories during the pre-crisis period help to explain why FOMC announcements impacted credit spreads. The Fed’s actions targeted at promoting growth and/or providing systemic liquidity were especially noted by the corporate bond market.

The current US tax code’s loss carry provisions provide implicit tax subsidies to financially troubled firms. Since shareholders ultimately decide when to announce bankruptcy, such tax subsidies can incentivize them to strategically postpone default. Therefore, corporate taxation can influence corporate cost of debt. Using a large panel of corporate bonds, we find supporting evidence: credit spreads become smaller as tax loss carries grow larger. In contrast, tax shields such as depreciation, which limit loss carry gains, lead to wider spreads. Interestingly, when stockholders hold greater bargaining power – due to large managerial ownership – larger corporate tax shields lead to even narrower credit spreads.

Research shows that by enhancing visibility, advertising improves stock liquidity and returns. Unlike stock holders, bond holders may view advertising skeptically. Without proven effectiveness in improving revenues, large pre-interest advertising expenditures can be seen as eroding a firm's ability to meet its debt service obligations. We find that although greater advertising by a firm improves liquidity of its bonds in the market, it does not lower the firm's cost of debt. However, firms with ineffective advertising experience reduced bond market liquidity and a higher cost of debt. Without a real positive economic impact, advertising has little or no value for bond investors.

Using a news-based index of geopolitical risk (GPR) and over 62 years of data, we find that GPR has a long-lasting negative impact on leverage. Our result is robust to different model specifications, different proxies for leverage, a battery of robustness tests, and survives after addressing endogeneity concerns. Further, we provide evidence that the effect is channeled through declining shifts in both the demand and supply of credit. Cross-sectional tests indicate that the effect is stronger for firms with higher existing leverage, those with more irreversible investment, and those whose stock returns are more sensitive to GPR. Overall, our analysis indicates that GPR is more important than other macro-level determinants of capital structure such as inflation, GDP growth, interest rate variables and other widely used measures of uncertainty.

Extant research argues that borrowing from financial intermediaries subjects managers to external monitoring. However, given managers' flexibility in choosing the type of debt financing, why would managers submit themselves to external monitoring? Recent theory points to the role of managerial incentive compensation. Specifically, it is argued that managers will borrow from financial intermediaries if their compensation is tied to firm performance. Additionally, it is noted that a more optimal compensation scheme will induce managers to undertake intermediated loans only when the firm is sufficiently profitable. Such a compensation scheme is likely to exist in opaque firm settings where borrowing from financial intermediaries can serve to signal firm profitability. Our study provides corroborative evidence. We find that the choice of syndicated bank loans is positively associated with CEO equity incentives. Second, this syndicated debt-incentive compensation link is influenced by firm profitability, particularly among information problematic firms. Overall, our study points to the role of incentive compensation in the debt placement decision.

Stock market reaction suggests that despite improved disclosure and increased accountability, Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) is too costly and not beneficial. Noting that bondholders are likely to reap the many potential benefits of SOX without bearing the brunt of costs, we examine how SOX affected corporate credit spreads to better assess its benefits. SOX has led to a significant structural decline in spreads of at least 27 basis points. Riskier firms (low rating, long maturity, high leverage, and small size) and firms closely related to SOX major provisions (earning variability, managerial trading, and corporate governance) experience greater declines in spreads.