ABSTRACT Despite theoretical and anecdotal evidence highlighting the importance of industry-level analyses to lenders, the empirical literature on debt pricing has focused almost exclusively on firm-level forces that affect expected loss. This paper provides empirical evidence that industry-level characteristics relate to debt pricing through risk premiums. We address the empirical challenges that arise when testing these theories by using a proprietary dataset of time-varying and forward-looking measures of industry characteristics. These characteristics include growth, sensitivity to external shocks, and industry structure, all measured at the six-digit NAICS level. Our results show that lenders demand higher spreads to bear industry-level risk. The relation exists within subsamples with constant credit ratings, and strengthens when lenders' loan portfolios are less diversified and during periods when diversification is difficult. Therefore, our results suggest that industry characteristics relate to debt pricing by informing lenders not only about expected loss, but also about risk premiums. JEL Classifications: G31; G32; G33; M21.

ABSTRACT This study examines whether analysts have an industry‐level information advantage over managers when forecasting earnings. While analysts are often viewed as industry experts, prior research fails to document such an advantage. We predict that analysts' industry‐level information advantage is more likely to exist in industries where firm performance is more sensitive to industry‐level external economic forces. We find that for such firms, analysts provide relatively more accurate earnings forecasts compared to managers. Consistent with our predictions, we further find that managers of such firms provide fewer and less precise forecasts and that this association is more pronounced in firms with higher analyst following. Collectively, these findings suggest that analysts have an industry‐level information advantage over managers when forecasting earnings for firms in industries with high sensitivity to external forces, and that industry sensitivity risk is a distinct industry characteristic that affects firm‐level disclosure.

ABSTRACT We examine the role of the coupon choice in bond contracts as a signaling mechanism in the presence of information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders about the credit quality of the borrower. Prior literature focuses on the use of maturity as a signaling mechanism. We conjecture that the coupon is a more effective signaling mechanism. We exploit the enactment of Regulation Fair Disclosure (RegFD) as an exogenous shock to the level of information asymmetry, and employ both bond- and equity market-based variables of information asymmetry to test our conjecture. We find that following the enactment of RegFD, the coupon rates of bonds issued by unrated firms increase relatively more than those of rated firms, consistent with the coupon choice addressing information asymmetry. We fail to find similar increases in maturity. Our inferences remain the same when using the probability of informed trade to measure relative changes in information asymmetry around the enactment of RegFD. We also draw similar conclusions utilizing exogenous drops in analyst coverage that result from brokerage house closures as an alternative quasi-natural experiment. Finally, we provide evidence that the coupon is used more extensively when issuance costs are higher, precisely when maturity is predicted to be a less efficient contract term with which to address information asymmetry. JEL Classifications: G10; G23; M21; M41.

ABSTRACT Prior literature presents various perspectives on the role of financial reporting. One view is that mandatory periodic reporting disciplines managers and encourages timely voluntary disclosure. We examine this “confirmation hypothesis” using the shock to financial reporting quality experienced by Arthur Andersen clients forced to switch auditors. Consistent with the confirmation hypothesis, we find that former Andersen clients increase disclosure after they change auditors. They increase forecasting frequency and enhance forecasting precision and specificity. We present additional cross-sectional evidence that shows Arthur Andersen clients with larger increases in financial reporting quality increased their disclosure by relatively more, even within the sample of Arthur Andersen clients. We supplement our main findings with a battery of tests to reduce the possibility that alternative shocks and uncertainty drive our results. Our findings support complementarity between financial reporting quality and voluntary disclosures.