Journal Article Professor Hansen and Keynesian Interest Theory: Comment Get access Alvin H. Hansen Alvin H. Hansen Harvard University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 69, Issue 4, November 1955, Pages 641–643, https://doi.org/10.2307/1882002 Published: 01 November 1955

Journal Article Classical, Loanable-Fund, and Keynesian Interest Theories Get access Alvin H. Hansen Alvin H. Hansen Harvard University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 65, Issue 3, August 1951, Pages 429–432, https://doi.org/10.2307/1882223 Published: 01 August 1951

Journal Article A Rejoiner Get access Alvin H. Hansen Alvin H. Hansen University of Minnesota Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 46, Issue 3, May 1932, Pages 562–565, https://doi.org/10.2307/1883402 Published: 01 May 1932

I. The argument that labor-saving improvements release purchasing power and so reabsorb displaced labor, 684.— The fallacy in this argument, 686.— Circumstances under which the displaced labor will be reabsorbed, 687.— II. Effect of price reduction, 688; of restrictions upon credit and wage rates, 690.— III. Effect of price maintenance, 692; of lower interest rates, 693.— IV. The effect of universal monopoly upon unemployment, 696.— Quasi-monopoly control of prices contrasted with rigid control of wage-rates, 697.

I. Marx's view of history is technological not economic. — II. The social process according to Marx, 75. — III. Technological changes, the class struggle and human adjustments to environment, 75. — IV. Forces lying back of technological evolution, according to Marx and Engels: extension of markets, development of science, cosmic evolution, 78. — V. The Marxian view against the background of fundamental factors and forces, 80. — VI. Criticism of the Marxian theory, 82. — VII. Conclusion, 83.

tinue to neglect them for the present purpose. The specialists who now buy bills from the Treasury and then resell them to the ultimate investors are presumably being compensated for their activities. They have many alternatives. It is hard to see that they receive any economic rent that the Treasury in any way taps by its present method of auction. On the contrary, the Treasury enables those specialized abilities required to guess accurately the outcome of weekly auctions to earn a higher rent than they otherwise could. Private distribution costs are therefore higher under the present method of auction than they would be under the alternative method. Who pays these additional costs? Since we have assumed that the demand by ultimate investors is not affected, since the amount of bills is presumably not affected, since the Treasury does not succeed in imposing discriminatory prices on ultimate investors, the price paid by ultimate investors must be roughly the same whatever the method of distribution. It follows that the Treasury must pay the additional distribution costs by receiving less on the average from its bills than if it used the alternative method of auction. Two final comments. First, if this analysis is correct, it means that Brimmer's conclusion that noncompetitive bidding should be eliminated from present auctions is wrong. The introduction of such bidding reduces the unnecessary cost imposed by the Treasury on itself by the present method of bidding. Second, the defects of the present method of auction are quantitatively minor, and may be negligible, for bills because of their short maturity, large volume, and broad market. The defects are far more important for bonds and are more important, the longer the maturity. The main obstacle to using auctions to distribute longer-term securities has been the implicit assumption that the present method of auctioning bills must be used for them as well, as it has been in earlier experiments. The adoption of the alternative method would enable the Treasury to auction all securities issued, whatever their maturity, at a gain both to itself and to the economy.5

to study policies affecting money and credit separately from fiscal policy, because the underlying cause-effect relations are so very different. In terms of a summary characterization of the new budget, what I have tried to convey is this: Let us not say that it is designed to show the impact of economic policies; let us rather say more modestly that it shows the impact of fiscal policies; and let us make clear that a detailed and comprehensive analysis of monetary and credit policies cannot be conducted within the framework of the NIP accounts.