ABSTRACT This paper presents the model of a relationship between a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur engaged in the formation of a new firm. I assume that the entrepreneur derives private nonpecuniary benefits from having some control over the firm. I show that to separate the entrepreneur's value of control from the firm's expected payoff, the venture capitalist demands disproportionately higher control rights than the size of his equity investment. The entrepreneur is compensated for a greater loss of control through better terms of financing, ability to extract higher rents from asymmetric information, and improved risk sharing.

We study the profitability of traders in two fully electronic and highly liquid markets: the Dow and Standard & Poor׳s 500 e-mini futures markets. Using unique information that identify counterparties to a transaction, we show and seek to explain the fact that the network pattern of trades captures the relations between behavior in the market and returns. Our approach includes a simple representation of how much a shock is amplified by the network and how widely it is transmitted. This representation provides a possible shorthand for understanding the consequences of a fat-finger trade, a withdrawing of liquidity, or other market shock.

We study the joint responses of commodity future prices and positions of various trader groups to changes of the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) before and after the recent financial crisis. Financial traders reduced their net long positions during the crisis in response to market distress, whereas hedgers facilitated this by reducing their net short positions as prices fell. This “convective risk flow” induced by the greater distress of financial institutions led to a change in the allocation of risk with hedgers holding more risk than they did previously. The presence of such a risk flow confirms the market impact of financial traders conditional on trades they initiate.

We study performance and competition among firms engaging in high-frequency trading (HFT). We construct measures of latency and find that differences in relative latency account for large differences in HFT firms’ trading performance. HFT firms that improve their latency rank due to colocation upgrades see improved trading performance. The stronger performance associated with speed comes through both the short-lived information channel and the risk management channel, and speed is useful for various strategies, including market making and cross-market arbitrage. We find empirical support for many predictions regarding relative latency competition.

We model the strategic provision of advice in environments where a principal's optimal action depends on an unobserved, binary state of interest. Experts receive signals about the state and each recommends an action. The principal and all experts dislike making errors in their decision and recommendations, respectively, but may have different costs of different errors. Is it in the principal's interest to let experts share information? Although sharing improves experts' ability to avoid errors, we identify a simple environment in which any principal, regardless of how he trades off the different errors, is worse off if he permits information sharing.

ABSTRACT We study intraday market intermediation in an electronic market before and during a period of large and temporary selling pressure. On May 6, 2010, U.S. financial markets experienced a systemic intraday event—the Flash Crash—where a large automated selling program was rapidly executed in the E‐mini S&P 500 stock index futures market. Using audit trail transaction‐level data for the E‐mini on May 6 and the previous three days, we find that the trading pattern of the most active nondesignated intraday intermediaries (classified as High‐Frequency Traders) did not change when prices fell during the Flash Crash.