We study the interaction between the currency choice of private domestic contracts and optimal monetary policy. The optimal currency choice depends on the price risk of each currency, as well as on the covariance of its price and the relative consumption needs of the agents signing the contract. When a larger share of contracts is denominated in local currency, the government can use inflation more effectively to either redistribute resources or reduce default costs, which makes local currency more attractive for private contracts. When governments lack commitment, competitive equilibria can be constrained inefficient, thus providing a reason to regulate the currency choice of private contracts. We show that both the equilibrium use of local currency and the implications for regulation depend on the level of domestic policy risk. Our model can explain the wide use of the US dollar in international trade contracts and the observed hysteresis in dollarization.

We develop a model that integrates modern theories of labor market flows with nominal wage rigidities to study the consequences of inflation on the labor market. Nominal wage stickiness incentivizes workers to engage in job-to-job transitions after an unexpected increase in the price level. Such dynamics lead to a rise in aggregate vacancies associating a seemingly tight labor market with lower real wages—two facts observed during the recent inflation period. The calibrated model jointly matches aggregate and cross-sectional trends in worker flows and wages during the 2021–2024 period. Using historical data, we show that prior periods of high inflation were also associated with increasing vacancies and upward shifts in the Beveridge curve. Our results suggest that policy makers and academics should be cautious about viewing the rise in the vacancy-to-unemployment rate as a sign of a tight labor market during inflationary periods without holistically looking at other labor market indicators.

We study the macroeconomic implications of asymmetric information in capital markets.We build a quantitative capital-accumulation model in which capital is traded in illiquid markets, with sellers having more information about capital quality than buyers.Asymmetric information distorts the terms of trade for sellers of high-quality capital, who list higher prices and are willing to accept lower trading probabilities to signal their type.Led by the model's predictions, we measure the distortions from asymmetric information by studying the relationship between listed prices and trading probabilities in a unique dataset of individual capital units listed for trade.By combining the empirical measurement with the model, we show that information asymmetries can play a quantitatively large role during economic crises when the degree of asymmetric information deteriorates.

We estimate how much firms differentiate pay premia between regular and outsourced workers in temp agency work arrangements. We leverage unique Argentinian administrative data that feature links between user firms (the workplaces where temp workers perform their labor) and temp agencies (their formal employers). We estimate that a high-wage user firm that pays a regular worker a 10% premium pays a temp worker on average only a 4.9% premium, compared to what these workers would earn in a low-wage user firm in their respective work arrangements. This 49% pass-through constitutes the midpoint between the benchmarks for insiders (one) and the competitive spot-labor market (zero).