Costello, Down, and Mehta (2020) trace their slider intervention to deviations from the credit line amount recommended by a credit scoring model. The deviations are followed by larger delinquency declines and bigger sales orders, and Costello et al. interpret these results using discretion-based theories. However, incremental deviations are concentrated on newer clients rather than those the lender has accumulated soft information about. Deviations also appear larger for public than private borrowers. My discussion evaluates whether these results align with discretion-based theories, and explores alternative interpretations based on salience and unique aspects of the trade credit setting. Differences in interpretation aside, the evidence is informative about technological advances in commercial lending. I conclude with an overview of several recent advances and discuss the implications for lending research.

We review the empirical accounting literature on private firms. Recent advances in data gathering provide new openings to examine private firms which, despite driving half of private sector economic activity, have historically been challenging to study. We provide a conceptual framework to organize the literature, centering on information production, information verification, and information dissemination. Four key takeaways emerge from our review. First, private firm settings offer unique advantages for understanding the economic role of accounting. Because private firms face less regulation than public firms, their accounting choices can shed light on economic tradeoffs that public firm choices cannot. Second, there is limited descriptive evidence on many fundamental accounting choices, including the extent to which private firms follow US GAAP, obtain an audit, or use various management accounting practices. Third, studies jointly modeling private and public firms provide more complete, robust analyses of the economy, regulation in particular. Fourth, private and public firms differ on many central dimensions, which raises difficulties related to conducting empirical analysis and assessing generalizability.

We study the consequences of a 2010 change in the investment adviser qualification exam that reallocated coverage from the rules and ethics section to the technical material section. Comparing advisers with the same employer in the same location and year, we find those passing the exam with more rules and ethics coverage are one-fourth less likely to commit misconduct. The exam change appears to affect advisers’ perception of acceptable conduct and not just their awareness of specific rules or selection into the qualification. Those passing the rules and ethics-focused exam are more likely to depart employers experiencing scandals. Such departures also predict future scandals. Our paper offers the first archival evidence on how rules and ethics training affects conduct and labor market activity in the financial sector.

ABSTRACT We examine the staggered adoption of additional educational requirements (“150‐hour rule”) for Certified Public Accountants (“CPAs”) to understand the effects of occupational licensing on minority participation in professional labor markets. The 150‐hour rule increased the educational requirement for CPAs from 120 to 150 credit hours, effectively adding a fifth year of study. We find a 13% greater entry decline following the requirement's enactment for minority than nonminority CPA candidates. Our analyses of parental income and financial aid availability point to a socioeconomic status channel explaining the differential entry declines. Studying exam passing patterns, professional misconduct, and job postings we find a deterioration, or at best, no change in CPA quality following enactment.

Using a dataset covering 3 million commercial borrower financial statements, we document a substantial, nearly monotonic decline in banks’ use of attested financial statements (AFS) in lending over the past two decades. Two market forces help explain this trend. First, technological advances provide lenders with access to a growing array of borrower information sources that can substitute for AFS. Second, banks are increasingly competing with nonbank lenders that rely less on AFS in screening and monitoring. Our results illustrate how technology adoption and changes in credit market structure can render AFS less efficient than alternative information sources for screening and monitoring.

Compliance-driven investments in technology—or “RegTech”—are growing rapidly. To understand the effects on the financial sector, we study firms’ responses to new internal control requirements. Affected firms make significant investments in ERP and hardware. These expenditures then enable complementary investments that are leveraged for noncompliance purposes, leading to modest savings from avoided customer complaints and misconduct. IT budgets rise and profits fall, especially at small firms, and acquisition activity and market concentration increase. Our results illustrate how regulation can directly and indirectly affect technology adoption, which in turn affects noncompliance functions and market structure.

ABSTRACT We study the influence of supervisors on employee misconduct at branches of U.S. financial institutions. Individual supervisor fixed effects explain twice as much variation in branch misconduct as firm fixed effects. Supervisor influence is concentrated in firms that theory suggests are most likely to delegate authority—firms with complex operations, distant branches, and trustworthy supervisors. Supervisors affect misconduct through their personnel decisions, attention to employees with past misbehavior, and ethics and industry rules training. After major internal control improvements, supervisor influence declines. Our results illustrate how supervisors influence misconduct above and beyond firm-level factors. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: D21; D82; G20, L22; L23; M12; M40.