The consumption of high-consumption households is more exposed to fluctuations in aggregate consumption and income than that of low-consumption households in the Consumer Expenditure (CEX) Survey. The exposure to aggregate consumption growth of households in the top 10 percent of the consumption distribution in the CEX is about five times that of households in the bottom 80 percent. Given real aggregate per capita consumption growth about 3 percentage points less than its historical mean during the past year, these figures predict that the ratio of consumption of the top 10 percent to the bottom 80 percent has fallen by about 15 percentage points (relative to trend). Using income data from Piketty and Saez (2003), we show that the income (especially the wage income) of rich households is more exposed to aggregate fluctuations, so their higher income exposure is a likely contributor to their higher consumption exposure. Finally, we find a striking change in the exposure of the incomes of high-income households: prior to the early 1980's, the incomes of high-income households were not more exposed to aggregate fluctuations. Thus, while high-income households currently bear an inordinately large share of aggregate fluctuations, this is a recent occurrence.

We provide new evidence on the success of long-run risks in asset pricing by focusing on the risks borne by stockholders. Exploiting microlevel household consumption data, we show that long-run stockholder consumption risk better captures cross-sectional variation in average asset returns than aggregate or nonstockholder consumption risk, and implies more plausible risk aversion estimates. We find that risk aversion around 10 can match observed risk premia for the wealthiest stockholders across sets of test assets that include the 25 Fama and French portfolios, the market portfolio, bond portfolios, and the entire cross-section of stocks.

We evaluate the impact of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) on shareholders by studying the lobbying behavior of investors and corporate insiders in order to affect the final implemented rules under SOX. Investors lobbied overwhelmingly in favor of strict implementation of SOX, while corporate insiders and business groups lobbied against strict implementation. We identify firms most affected by the law as those whose insiders lobbied against strict implementation. Such firms appear to be characterized by agency problems, rather than motivated by concerns over compliance costs. Cumulative stock returns during the five and a half months leading up to SOX passage were approximately 7% higher for corporations whose insiders lobbied against SOX disclosure‐related provisions than for similar non‐lobbying firms, consistent with an expectation that SOX would reduce agency problems. Analysis of returns in the post‐passage implementation period suggests that investors' positive expectations with regards to the effects of these provisions were warranted.

We provide new evidence on the success of long‐run risks in asset pricing by focusing on the risks borne by stockholders . Exploiting microlevel household consumption data, we show that long‐run stockholder consumption risk better captures cross‐sectional variation in average asset returns than aggregate or nonstockholder consumption risk, and implies more plausible risk aversion estimates. We find that risk aversion around 10 can match observed risk premia for the wealthiest stockholders across sets of test assets that include the 25 Fama and French portfolios, the market portfolio, bond portfolios, and the entire cross‐section of stocks.