Market liquidity is impacted by the presence of financial intermediaries that are informed and active participants in both the equity and the syndicated bank loan markets, specifically informationally advantaged lead arrangers of syndicated bank loans that simultaneously act as equity market makers (dual market makers). Employing a two-stage procedure with instrumental variables, we identify the simultaneous equations model of liquidity and dual market maker decisions. We find that the presence of dual market makers improves the liquidity of the more competitive and transparent equity markets, but widens the spread in the less competitive over-the-counter loan market, particularly for small, informationally opaque firms.

This paper utilizes a new data set from AllianceBernstein that, unlike other corporate governance data, has monthly-updated firm-level governance ratings for 21 emerging markets countries for almost a five year period. With these unique data, we examine how changes in corporate governance ratings impact firm valuation. Using this test we find evidence that improvements in corporate governance result in significantly higher valuations.

Recent evidence demonstrates that corporate payout policy has shifted from the nearly exclusive use of dividend payout to the inclusion of stock repurchase, primarily through open markets. This trend has been attributed to the tax advantages associated with repurchase relative to dividends. In this paper, we introduce personal taxation and stock repurchase to reexamine the relation between returns and the bid–ask spread. Our model provides insight into the nature of this relation. Tests performed using NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ data provide empirical support of our theoretical conclusions. We conclude that the firm’s choice of payout policy influences the relation between returns and spreads.