We ask whether the correlation between mortgage leverage and default is due to moral hazard (the causal effect of leverage) or adverse selection (ex ante risky borrowers choosing larger loans). We separate these information asymmetries using a natural experiment resulting from the contract structure of option adjustable-rate mortgages and unexpected 2008 divergence of indexes that determine rate adjustments. Our point estimates suggest that moral hazard is responsible for 40% of the correlation in our sample, while adverse selection explains 60%. We calibrate a simple model to show that leverage regulation must weigh default prevention against distortions due to adverse selection.

We show that the COVID-19 pandemic brought house price and rent declines in city centers, and price and rent increases away from the center, thereby flattening the bid-rent curve in most U.S. metropolitan areas. Across MSAs, the flattening of the bid-rent curve is larger when working from home is more prevalent, housing markets are more regulated, and supply is less elastic. Housing markets predict an urban revival with urban rent growth exceeding suburban rent growth for the foreseeable future, as working from home recedes.