This paper provides evidence of risk‐shifting behavior in the investment decisions of financially distressed firms. Using a real options framework, I show that shareholders' risk‐shifting incentives can reverse the expected negative relation between volatility and investment. I test two hypotheses that are consistent with risk‐shifting behavior: (i) volatility has a positive effect on distressed firms' investment; (ii) investments of distressed firms generate less value during times of high uncertainty. Empirical evidence using 40 years of data supports both hypotheses. I further evaluate the effect of various firm characteristics on risk shifting, and estimate the costs of the investment distortion.

What is the impact of long-term executive compensation, particularly large pension payouts, on the firm's current dividend policy? We argue that managers with high pension holdings are less likely to adopt a high dividend policy that can risk their future pension payouts. Using a hand-collected actuarial pension dataset we show that (i) dividend payments are significantly lower when manager compensation relies more heavily on pension payouts; (ii) higher compensation leverage and inside debt have a significant negative effect on dividend payments net of stock repurchases; and (iii) the negative effect of pension on dividend is significantly weaker when pensions are protected in a pre-funding rabbi trust. We show further that this agency behavior reduces firm performance.

We show that demand pressure from retail investors makes options on low-price stocks relatively expensive—delta-hedged options on low-price stocks underperform those on high-price stocks by 0.63% per week for calls and 0.36% for puts. Natural experiments corroborate this finding: options become more expensive following stock splits, options on mini indices are more expensive than those on main indices, and mini contract options are more expensive than standard options. We attribute our findings to retail investors’ preference for skewness and divergence of opinion. Limits to arbitrage and strategic quote setting by market makers contribute to, but do not fully explain, this effect.

This paper examines how the similarity between the executive compensation leverage ratio and the firm leverage ratio affects the quality of the firm’s investment decisions. A larger leverage gap (i.e., a bigger difference between these two ratios) leads to more investment distortions. Managers with more debt-like compensation components tend to under-invest, whereas managers with larger equity-based compensation engage more in over-investment. Furthermore, investment distortion is likely to increase the equity (debt) value when compensation leverage is lower (higher) than firm leverage. These findings suggest that managers can deviate from an optimal investment policy to increase the value of their portfolio, and that a lower leverage gap can reduce agency costs.

This paper demonstrates that value-relevant information about a firm appearing in regulatory disclosures of other firms is overlooked by investors. Firms highly mentioned in the 10-K competition section of other firms tend to outperform with risk-adjusted returns of up to 9% annually. Outperformance is concentrated in firms whose competition references are made in the context of targeting rather than admiration. Consistent with investor inattention, abnormal returns stem from cross-sector competition mentions as well as firms with low-analyst coverage. Moreover, highly mentioned firms exhibit improved fundamentals in subsequent years, further signifying they are underpriced.

This paper documents that short-term options achieve significantly lower returns during months with 4 versus 5 weeks between expiration dates. The average return differential ranges from 16 to 29 basis points per week for delta-hedged portfolios, and from 101 to 187 basis points per week for straddles, over 1996–2017. Evidence based on earnings announcements and institutional holdings suggests that investor inattention to exact expiration date rather than underlying risk exposures or transaction costs can explain the mispricing. Market makers seem to adjust prices accordingly, and tend to over-trade mispriced options against less sophisticated investors.

We study whether default options are mispriced in equity values by employing a structural equity valuation model that explicitly takes into account the value of the option to default (or abandon the firm) and uses firm‐specific inputs. We implement our model on the entire cross section of stocks and identify both over‐ and underpriced equities. An investment strategy that buys undervalued stocks and shorts overvalued stocks generates an annual four‐factor alpha of about 11% for U.S. stocks. The model's performance is stronger for stocks with a higher value of the default option, such as distressed or highly volatile stocks.