I analyze investment, q, and cash flow in a tractable stochastic model in which marginal q and average q are identically equal. I introduce classical measurement error and derive closed-form expressions for the coefficients in regressions of investment on q and cash flow. The cash-flow coefficient is positive and larger for faster growing firms, yet there are no financial frictions in the model. I develop the concepts of bivariate attenuation and weight shifting to interpret the estimated coefficients on q and cash flow in the presence of measurement error.

We study variation in skill demands for professionals across firms and labor markets. We categorize a wide range of keywords found in job ads into 10 general skills. There is substantial variation in these skill requirements, even within narrowly defined occupations. Focusing particularly on cognitive and social skills, we find positive correlations between each skill and external measures of pay and firm performance. We also find evidence of a cognitive social skill complementarity for both outcomes. As a whole, job skills have explanatory power in pay and firm performance regressions beyond what is available in widely used labor market data.

Congress pursues externalities one at a time. The resulting legislation embodies the same sequential approach, instructing regulatory agencies to set and enforce standards for a single problem. Rarely, if ever, are agencies instructed or even permitted to account for contradictions with other federal legislation and rulemaking.

Few economists are aware of a wonderful problem. While climatologists claimed it first, the twists and turns make- the problem appear almost as if it were devised to show off the tools and controversies of microeconomics. Even more astounding is the fact that such an abstract, long-term problem excites the interest of the general public and media, and even politicians who desire more resources 1O be spent on research.

We consider the problem of constructing confidence intervals (CIs) for a linear functional of a regression function, such as its value at a point, the regression discontinuity parameter, or a regression coefficient in a linear or partly linear regression. Our main assumption is that the regression function is known to lie in a convex function class, which covers most smoothness and/or shape assumptions used in econometrics. We derive finite‐sample optimal CIs and sharp efficiency bounds under normal errors with known variance. We show that these results translate to uniform (over the function class) asymptotic results when the error distribution is not known. When the function class is centrosymmetric, these efficiency bounds imply that minimax CIs are close to efficient at smooth regression functions. This implies, in particular, that it is impossible to form CIs that are substantively tighter using data‐dependent tuning parameters, and maintain coverage over the whole function class. We specialize our results to inference on the regression discontinuity parameter, and illustrate them in simulations and an empirical application.

We examine the valuation impact of an employee-friendly (EF) culture. Using a sample of 3446 firms from 43 countries for the period 2003 to 2014, we show that firms with a more EF culture are valued higher and perform better (ROA, ROE). Consistent with the good governance view, the impact is stronger for firms in countries with better investor protection and for firms with better governance and lower agency costs. We further document a positive valuation associated with the enactment of laws aimed at improving parental leave policies. The impact on valuation stems from improved technical efficiency. Using various approaches, our results suggest that the impact of an EF culture on firm value is causal.

We develop a Clawback Strength Index and show that while some firms adopt unambiguous and strong clawback provisions, others adopt weak ones. We find that strong clawback adopters experience improvements in financial reporting quality, fewer CEO turnovers, and lower CEO pay. We advance two possible explanations: First, clawback strength may be primarily responsible for the improvements in reporting quality. Second, strong clawbacks may yield benefits because they are part of a broader reform package. While our findings on reporting quality and CEO turnover are consistent with both explanations, our results on CEO pay support only the broader reform explanation.

News media plays an important role in modern financial markets. In this article, we analyze the role played by the news media in an historical financial market. Using The Times’s coverage of companies listed on the London stock market between 1825 and 1870, we examine the determinants of media coverage in this era and whether media coverage affected returns. Our main finding is that a media effect mainly manifests itself after the mid-1840s and that the introduction of arm’s-length ownership along with markedly increased market participation was the main reason for the emergence of this media effect.