Abstract The objective of this research is to better understand experts' contributions to the prospective evaluation of a new audit standard—in this case, key audit matter (KAM) reporting. To this end, we assisted the Canadian Auditing and Assurance Standards Board by leading its consultation of 22 expert financial statement users. The methodology employed to observe our participants' opinions and cognitive processes involves thought protocol and interviews. By analyzing the rhetorical base of experts' prospective analysis, we show that our participants' arguments are often laden with postulates and lack data points, leading to generalizations. Sounder arguments entail more nuanced views but lead to uncertainties. We therefore highlight a tension between the rhetorical content of experts' insights and the calculative rationality of a cost‐benefit analysis. We also find that experts with less cognitive flexibility are less likely to be supportive of the adoption of a standard implying a change of habits in the way they process information. This tension and cognitive bias generate a significant interpretive challenge to determine a clear and dominant stance in the consultation. We discuss the implications of these findings for the legitimacy of prospective evaluations and the conduct of cost‐benefit consultations with experts. We also contribute to the literature on KAMs by substantiating concerns about the value of extended auditor reports to users.

ABSTRACT In this study, we examine auditors' claims of professional disempowerment and strategic responses to Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB) inspections. Our research is based primarily on 27 semistructured interviews with audit partners (23) and managers (4) of large accounting firms. Drawing on key insights from institutional theory, we show that the tensions between inspectors and auditors reflect an intraprofessional tug‐of‐war between two competing but legitimate logics of professionalism. More specifically, our findings indicate that CPAB inspections have given rise to a mechanical logic of audit professionalism that is driven by the efforts of inspectors to promote a generalizable theoretical ideal of auditing that revolves around best practices and attention to technical minutiae. This mechanical logic competes with a clinical logic of audit professionalism that is driven by the efforts of audit partners and managers to promote a more relativistic, applied form of expert knowledge. To manage this dynamic of intra‐institutional complexity, quality experts (QEs) have emerged in firms' organizational structures as ambidextrous third parties—that is, professionals who master both logics and are capable of bridging the institutional divide by influencing the relationships between inspectors and auditors through a variety of brokering strategies. By considering inspectors as insiders rather than outsiders to the profession, we argue that auditors' claims of professional disempowerment should be interpreted carefully and critically. We also suggest that the professional autonomy and judgment of engagement partners and managers has been displaced significantly within firm boundaries into the hands of QEs. Our analysis offers a richer conceptualization of institutional ambidexterity by examining it as a relational process of social influence rather than as a set of individual characteristics.

ABSTRACT Auditees can play an active role in influencing staff auditors' professional judgment and skepticism. Yet, although it constitutes one of the main threats to auditor independence, very little is known about the means and extent of auditees' power during the audit engagement. To address this knowledge gap, our study focuses on a specific category of auditees, namely, auditees who have worked as auditors in large accounting firms. We interviewed 36 of these auditees and triangulated our findings with 11 interviews conducted with auditors. At the theoretical level, we conceptualize auditees' influence over auditors as intentional and active through the notion of “social power.” Overall, our analysis shows that the efficacy of auditees' power during the engagement materializes through the mobilization of two main power resources developed during their time at the firms: (i) expert knowledge of auditing techniques and (ii) social capital. On the one hand, relying on their cognitive authority, auditees' employ three different power strategies to constrain staff auditors' operational independence: stage‐setting , teaching , and questioning . On the other hand, auditees' social capital can support the use of two additional strategies: attracting and monitoring . Our triangulation analysis confirms our findings and suggests that auditors may be aware of the threats to independence that auditee expertise and social capital pose. By focusing on auditees' agentic capabilities—that is, individuals' capabilities to consciously exert influence over the course of events—we reinterpret the pressures exerted by clients on auditors as the product of strategic actions and discuss substantive consequences for independence risk.

ABSTRACT Accounting firms have traditionally operated as both elite and reinventive institutions that offer a structured and prestigious career path and enforce a deeply transformative socialization process for auditors. However, recent labor market shifts and evolving work preferences are challenging this regime of power, with significant implications for firms and their employees. Drawing on 31 semistructured interviews with auditors in Canada, our study examines how these changes are reshaping power dynamics within accounting firms. First, we find that firms are increasingly struggling to define and produce the ideal auditor. Instead, as we highlight, they are experiencing the emergence of the default auditor , a professional shaped more by labor market constraints and transactional engagement than by traditional firm‐driven selection and disciplinary mechanisms. Second, we analyze the erosion of pastoral power (i.e., power rooted in guidance and care) within firms, as staff auditors prioritize the care of the self, while partners and managers (P&Ms) increasingly struggle to establish and sustain pastoral relationships with their subordinates. As a result of this erosion, P&Ms fluctuate between self‐sacrifice (i.e., taking on additional responsibilities to compensate for auditors' disengagement) and a growing sense of inequity (i.e., feeling they are giving too much while receiving too little in return). To capture this growing impasse, we develop the concept of disciplinary and pastoral paralysis , a state in which P&Ms can no longer rely on traditional mechanisms of discipline and punishment to enforce norms of professional conduct but also struggle to reinvent new forms of pastoral power. We examine the implications of this loss of control, questioning whether it represents a temporary shift or a more permanent transformation. Finally, we discuss the broader consequences of accounting firms becoming less like normalizing institutions and more like “ normal ” organizations.

Abstract Using a qualitative research design and drawing on an identity work perspective, we explore how LGBTQI+ professional accountants relate their self‐identity to their professional occupation and manage their stigmatized identity at work. Sharing original empirical data from focus groups and semi‐structured interviews with LGBTQI+ professional accountants, we show how they engage in inward‐facing identity work by resisting stigmatizing pressures by conceiving of a self that is both outside the norm (“deviant”) and adapted to it (i.e., a deviant‐adapted self). However, we also find that stigmatized identities can be embraced by participants as legitimate sources of distinct professional dispositions and a more powerful work ethic. This finding offers a less confrontational view of how marginalized identities and sexuality intersect with the accounting profession. In outward‐facing processes of identity work, we show considerable variations in how and when participants communicate about their stigmatized identity. Finally, we highlight the collective dynamic of stigma management as a fundamental condition of possibility for targets to overcome the limits of atomized individual action. However, this collective dynamic entails the risk of all targets being absorbed into a collective representation and social‐identity that either makes them invisible, or directly opposes certain aspects of their self‐identity. In this respect, we show how some of our participants actively contribute to the creation of a collective social‐identity to combat stigmatization within firms, which in turn generates symbolic power differentials and symbolic violence within LGBTQI+ professional accountants.

ABSTRACT While prior research focuses on the audit team made up of auditors, we focus on the collective audit team made up of auditors and specialists—in our context, information technology (IT) specialists. Complex systems in today's audits and researcher and regulator concerns regarding ineffective coordination and communication between the two specializations motivate better understanding of this collective audit team. We investigate how auditors and IT specialists perceive their relationship and how the audit process unfolds when these relationships are good and when they are difficult. Results of interviews conducted with Big 4 audit and IT practitioners provide evidence that they perceive their relationship quality to depend on the level of mutual value and respect. Auditors assert a one‐team view of the collective audit team that includes IT specialists, but IT specialists feel auditors see them as a separate team and a “necessary evil.” The audit process vastly differs between relationships perceived as difficult and good. In difficult relationships, the two specializations often struggle for status, with limited communication or effort to understand how their work fits together. Our findings imply difficult relationships are at risk for poor integration and unsupported reliance on IT functions, shedding light on recurring threats to audit quality identified by PCAOB inspections. In good relationships, auditors and IT specialists appear motivated to engage in frequent and open communication to help understand, coordinate, and complete the audit. Inferences gleaned from good relationships let us highlight prescriptions for audit firms to improve effectiveness of collective audit teams.