Manmade climate change (CC) has catastrophic consequences. The United States has already experienced wholesale population realignment due to climate as households have relocated to the Sunbelt and West. The irony is that people are moving toward the heat and major storms associated with CC. As CC intensifies, with high rates of internal US factor mobility, firms and households will likely again relocate to areas with higher utility and profits, reducing CC costs. Yet current research typically focuses on CC costs in a given location without considering this realignment. We propose several avenues to overcome such shortcomings in US CC modeling.

ABSTRACT Enforcement of non‐compete agreements could affect executives' and directors' incentives to profit from their information advantage. This is because excessive trading profits could result in job termination, which would trigger the restrictions imposed by the non‐compete agreements. We find that executives' and directors' insider trading profits from sales are lower for companies headquartered in states with greater enforcement of non‐compete agreements. The path analyses suggest that high enforcement of non‐compete agreements disincentivizes managers to profit from their information advantage to avoid the possibility of job termination and the cost of job terminations. We also find that insiders in companies headquartered in states with greater enforcement of non‐compete agreements are less likely to exploit their information advantage by timing their sales before unfavorable corporate earnings announcements. The results suggest that enforcement of non‐compete agreements reduces executives' and directors' incentives by imposing costs on future outside employment opportunities.