Using federal contractor data, this paper examines the political costs hypothesis through the impact of government scrutiny and political sensitivity on executive compensation. The political cost hypothesis proffers that firms subject to government scrutiny take actions to deflect potential negative government reactions which can result in increased political costs for the firm. Results suggest that government contractor firms with the most political sensitivity (i.e., firms with government contracts that are most visible and comprise significant portions of their revenue) are associated with lower total (and excess) compensation to their CEOs, but with larger portions of cash, leading to lower long-term CEO wealth performance sensitivity. However, politically sensitive contractors with significant bargaining power (due to concentration, competition, or political contributions), are actually associated with greater excess compensation than other politically sensitive firms. These findings provide insight into the effects and limitations of additional government monitoring of executive compensation.

We examine changes in corporate policies following recessions during CEO tenures to evaluate the value of learning. CEOs with recession experience demonstrate expertise in risk-shifting strategies that can contribute to higher firm value and performance during subsequent recessions. Specifically, Recession CEOs use conservative capital structure and allocation during expansions, providing excess capacity and financial slack to accumulate additional cash reserves during economic contractions, resulting in lower bankruptcy risk. As a result, Recession CEOs are equipped to raise more capital in recessions, which results in higher asset growth fueled by investments in acquisitions and capital expenditures. We also examine prior recessions and find poor performers learn to invest more and perform better in subsequent contractions. Our results are strengthened through cumulative recession experiences, when downturns are deeper, and at cyclical firms, where economic cycles are most impactful and Recession CEOs are more relevant. Finally, we use time-varying industry downturns, matching, and CEO turnovers for inference. Overall, we offer novel evidence of valuable CEO learning around risk-taking following direct managerial experience as a firm policy determinant across economic conditions.