We examine the impact deciding to route limit orders away from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has on three dimensions of execution quality with methodologies controlling for market conditions and order submission strategies. Overall differences in limit order execution quality between regional stock exchanges and the NYSE are small, suggesting that the order routing decision may not affect retail limit order traders substantively. Conditioning on the distance between the limit order's price and prevailing quotes, however, reveals systematic differences in execution quality. This implies that brokers can strategically route limit orders to improve retail limit order execution quality.

The 1964 Securities Acts Amendments extended disclosures mandated of NYSE firms to most firms trading in the Over-the-Counter (OTC) market. Although some prior evidence suggests substantial value increases for OTC firms due to the “value enhancing” mandated disclosures, we find no statistical difference in announcement returns for OTC firms moving to the NYSE before and after the legislation. One purported advantage to investors from the 1964 legislation was increased financial reporting. Yet, we document that the bulk of OTC firms analyzed in prior studies was already providing investors financial information before the legislation. Apparently, investors did not value the mandated disclosures. We do find evidence that the NYSE benefited from the legislation by increasing the number of OTC firms switching to their exchange around its passage.

Acquisitions among New York Stock Exchange specialist firms can increase specialist firm size, capitalization, and market concentration, and thereby affect the market quality of the stocks they trade. We find that while traded stocks show significant improvement in several market quality measures following acquisitions, similar changes are evident in matched control stocks not involved in acquisitions. We conclude that specialist firm acquisitions either do not improve market quality, or improve market quality, but competitive and other pressures (resulting partly from the acquisitions themselves) force improvements in market quality for control stocks also. Either interpretation implies that specialist acquisitions have not had deleterious effects on market quality.

The National Association of Security Dealers alleges that professional-trader use of the Small Order Execution System (SOES) causes greater security price volatility. We docu? ment bidirectional Granger causality between a proxy for professional SOES trading (the frequency of maximum-sized SOES trades) and a measure of stock price volatility. We find that high levels of volatility precede high levels of maximum-sized SOES trades, suggesting that volatility causes more frequent large SOES trades. Likewise, over a one-minute time interval, high levels of maximum-sized SOES trades cause high volatility. Over longer periods, however, intense maximum-sized SOES trading causes lower volatility. Inter? preted in conjunction with Harris and Schultz (1997), these results suggest that high levels of maximum-sized SOES trades lead to more efficient price discovery. In light of these results, we believe that efforts to eliminate SOES based on volatility considerations are unwarranted.

We examine the impact deciding to route limit orders away from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has on three dimensions of execution quality with methodologies controlling for market conditions and order submission strategies. Overall differences in limit order execution quality between regional stock exchanges and the NYSE are small, suggesting that the order routing decision may not affect retail limit order traders substantively. Conditioning on the distance between the limit order’s price and prevailing quotes, however, reveals systematic differences in execution quality. This implies that brokers can strategically route limit orders to improve retail limit order execution quality.

ABSTRACT In its response to the 1975 Congressional mandate to implement a national market system for financial securities, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) initially exempted the option market. Recent dramatic changes in the structure of the option market prompted the SEC to revisit this issue. We examine a sample of actively traded, multiply listed equity options to ask whether this market's characteristics appear consistent with the goals of producing economically efficient transactions and facilitating “best execution.” We find marked changes between June 2000, when quotes are often ignored, and January 2002, when the market more closely resembles a national market.

Using trade and quote data from the NYSE, we examine the relation between dealer attention, dealer revenue, and the probability of informed trade. We find that dealer revenue net of losses to better-informed traders in NYSE stocks is positively related to the speed at which quotes adjust to full information levels. The speed of quote adjustment is faster for stocks with greater dealer attention, as measured by a stock’s relative prominence at its post and panel location on the NYSE floor. The level of dealer attention in turn is positively related to a stock’s probability of information-based trading. The results are consistent with a theoretical model we derive in which dealers trade multiple securities and must optimally allocate their limited attention to monitoring order flow to minimize losses to better-informed traders.

Using data from 2002 to 2013, we show that algorithmic trading has a positive impact on firm value. Most of this positive impact flows through the channels of stock liquidity, idiosyncratic volatility, and idiosyncratic skewness, but algorithmic trading also has a large economic effect outside those channels. We use the advent of auto quotation on the New York Stock Exchange as an exogenous shock to algorithmic trading to rule out reverse causality. The positive effects of algorithmic trading on firm value are stronger for larger firms and in the post-2007 period when algorithmic trading intensity is higher.