Abstract We examine how analysts respond to public information when setting stock recommendations. We model the determinants of analysts' recommendation changes following large stock price movements. We find evidence of an asymmetry following large positive and negative returns. Following large stock price increases, analysts are equally likely to upgrade or downgrade. Following large stock price declines, analysts are more likely to downgrade. This asymmetry exists after accounting for investment banking relationships and herding behavior. This result suggests recommendation changes are “sticky” in one direction, with analysts reluctant to downgrade. Moreover, this result implies that analysts' optimistic bias may vary through time.

This paper tests the hypothesis that negative client stock returns following the revelation that Enron documents had been shredded are attributable to confounding effects as opposed to a loss of Andersen's reputation. We find that a sharp decline in oil prices along with differences in the industry composition of the Andersen and Big 4 client portfolios combine to produce significantly more negative returns for Andersen clients relative to Big 4 clients, and for Andersen's Houston office clients relative to its clients in other locations. The market reaction to two other Enron-related events also offers little support for a reputation effect.

This study examines the influence of Mexico’s efforts to improve corporate governance on firm performance and transparency. We utilize compliance data from the Code of ‘Best’ Corporate Practices, disclosed annually by public firms in Mexico, as a measure of corporate governance strength. We document a significant increase in compliance over 2000–2004 indicating Mexican companies view non-compliance as costly. However, we find no association between the governance index and firm performance, nor is there a relation with transparency. Instead, we find firms with greater compliance resort to the more costly mechanism of making dividend payments (higher propensity to pay and greater yield) to reduce agency conflicts. We conclude these associations are the direct result of the institutional features of the Mexican business environment, which is characterized by concentrated ownership of insiders, interlocked boards of directors, a lack of insider trading enforcement, and generally poor protection of minority investors. Our results show that monitoring mechanisms alone are not enough to fundamentally change economic behavior.

This study examines former Arthur Andersen clients and provides evidence on the factors involved in their selection of new auditors after Andersen's collapse. Using a unique dataset that identifies whether former Andersen clients followed their audit team to a new auditor, findings reveal companies with greater agency concerns were more likely to sever ties with their former auditor, whereas those with greater switching costs were more likely to follow their former auditor. We also investigate the effect of the forced auditor change on financial statement quality in an effort to provide insight into the mandatory auditor rotation debate. Using performance-adjusted discretionary accruals as a proxy for reporting quality, our results fail to reveal significant improvements for companies with extreme discretionary accruals that severed ties with Andersen, which is inconsistent with the notion that mandatory rotation improves financial reporting.

ABSTRACT: Using a comprehensive sample of switches to and from the largest auditors (i.e., the Big N), we examine empirically whether the sensitivity of Big N auditor switches to client risk and misalignment changed between the pre- and post-Enron periods. Although we find an increase in the sensitivity to client misalignment, the sensitivity to client risk generally decreases. The results are consistent with Big N auditors rebalancing their audit client portfolios in response to post-Enron capacity constraints arising from the supply of former Arthur Andersen clients and the audit demands imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley rather than increasing their sensitivity to client risk. Additional evidence indicates that the Sarbanes-Oxley demand shock did not affect Big N auditor switching behavior incremental to the initial Andersen supply shock.

ABSTRACT This study analyzes whether fair value estimates of fund net asset values (NAVs) produced by private equity managers are accurate and unbiased predictors of future discounted cash flows (DCFs). We exploit the fact that private equity funds have finite lives to compare reported NAVs to DCFs based on realized cash flows for 384 Venture Capital (VC) funds and 195 Buyout funds spanning 1988–2016. Findings reveal that Buyout funds' NAVs display little systematic bias, but VC funds' NAVs are relatively aggressively biased compared to Buyout funds, especially since 2000. Accuracy is worse in the first half of the sample period even though NAV estimates generally are more conservative. Overall, the results reveal significant differences in the association between NAVs and DCFs for Buyout versus VC funds, which is particularly important for private equity fund investors in their consideration of the relevance and reliability of NAV estimates provided by fund managers.