Abstract We study the effects of a market-wide short-sale constraint in a dynamic economy with heterogeneous beliefs. Imposing the constraint reduces the stock price if the optimistic investors' intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) is less than one and increases the stock price if the optimist's IES is greater than one. In calibrated examples, the optimist's market price of risk falls and the interest rate rises when the constraint binds. Imposing the constraint leads to a higher stock volatility if the optimist's IES is less than one and a lower stock volatility if the IES is greater than one.

We value a firm that pays its cash flows to equity through share repurchases in a dynamic environment where personal taxes are paid on capital gains upon realization. The cost of capital is reduced by approximately 0.8% through the use of repurchases relative to dividends. We use the empirical distribution of pre-tax free cash flows in Fama and French (1999) to evaluate the tradeoffs between the costs of financial distress, the personal-tax advantages of equity, and the corporate-tax advantage to debt. The optimal capital structure is interior with a 3% bankruptcy cost.

The authors examine the effect of segmented commodity markets on the relation between forward future spot exchange rates in a dynamic economy. They calculate the slope coefficient in their theoretical economy from regressing exchange rate changes on forward premia. With reasonable parameter values, the slope coefficient is less than unity. However, even for extreme parameters the slope is not less than zero, as found in the data. A negative slope coefficient in a nominal version of the model requires the covariance between monetary shocks and relative output shocks to be significantly negative, in contrast to the covariance in the data.

This study considers a model in which a corporate manager has private information and engages in i) anonymous trading on personal account in the secondary market, and ii) the corporate issuance of new shares in the primary market. The paper examines the equilibrium tradeoff of insider trading profits against the manager's share of the corporate consequences of the primary issue. In the resulting equilibrium, managers, acting in their own best interests, seem to behave according to differing objective functions. In some cases, they seem to maximize intrinsic value, in others, insider trading profits seem to dominate, and still others seem to be concerned with both. Hence, the presence of anonymous trading around corporate financings brings into question the use of corporate objective functions with exogenously fixed weights.

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority began collecting transaction data from broker-dealers in 2011 as a step toward enhancing its understanding of securitization markets. We use transaction data to document the importance of the interdealer network structure to market quality. Some dealers are relatively central in the network and trade with many dealers, while others are peripheral. Core dealers receive relatively lower and less dispersed spreads than peripheral dealers. We develop a model in which core and peripheral dealers trade with different customer clienteles and argue that the presence of relatively sophisticated customers in securitization markets explains these facts. Received June 23, 2015; editorial decision December 20, 2016 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority began collecting transaction data from brokerdealers in 2011 as a step toward enhancing its understanding of securitization markets. We use transaction data to document the importance of the interdealer network structure to market quality. Some dealers are relatively central in the network and trade with many dealers, while others are peripheral. Core dealers receive relatively lower and less dispersed spreads than peripheral dealers. We develop a model in which core and peripheral dealers trade with different customer clienteles and argue that the presence of relatively sophisticated customers in securitization markets explains these facts.

[We study insider trading in a dynamic setting. Rational, but uninformed, traders choose between investment projects with different levels of insider trading. Insider trading distorts investment toward assets with less private information. However, when investment is sufficiently information elastic, insider trading can be welfare-enhancing because of more informative prices. When insiders repeatedly receive information, they trade to reveal it when investment is information elastic because good news increases investment and hence future insider profits. Thus, more information is revealed and uninformed agents are exploited less frequently by insiders. Both effects are Pareto-improving. Finally, we consider various insider-trading regulations.]

We study insider trading in a dynamic setting. Rational, but uninformed, traders choose between investment projects with different levels of insider trading. Insider trading distorts investment toward assets with less private information. However, when investment is sufficiently information elastic, insider trading can be welfare-enhancing because of more informative prices. When insiders repeatedly receive information, they trade to reveal it when investment is information elastic because good news increases investment and hence future insider profits. Thus, more information is revealed and uninformed agents are exploited less frequently by insiders. Both effects are Pareto-improving. Finally, we consider various insider-trading regulations.

We characterize the conditions under which efficient portfolios put small weights on individual assets. These conditions bound mean returns with measures of average absolute covariability between assets. The bounds clarify the relationship between linear asset pricing models and well-diversified efficient portfolios. We argue that the extreme weightings in sample efficient portfolios are due to the dominance of a single factor in equity returns. This makes it easy to diversify on subsets to reduce residual risk, while weighting the subsets to reduce factor risk simultaneously. The latter involves taking extreme positions. This behavior seems unlikely to be attributable to sampling error.

ABSTRACT We characterize the conditions under which efficient portfolios put small weights on individual assets. These conditions bound mean returns with measures of average absolute covariability between assets. The bounds clarify the relationship between linear asset pricing models and well‐diversified efficient portfolios. We argue that the extreme weightings in sample efficient portfolios are due to the dominance of a single factor in equity returns. This makes it easy to diversify on subsets to reduce residual risk, while weighting the subsets to reduce factor risk simultaneously. The latter involves taking extreme positions. This behavior seems unlikely to be attributable to sampling error.