Journal Article The Compatibility of Any Behaviour of the Price Level with Equilibrium Get access J. C. Gilbert J. C. Gilbert Sheffield Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 24, Issue 3, June 1957, Pages 177–184, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296066 Published: 01 June 1957

Reviews the book "Determinants of Capital Expenditures: An Interview Study," by Robert Eisner.

Abstract An accounting instructor's work is comparable to that of the football coach. The coach can teach his players the theory of football and get them to understand his diagrams but unless he conducts regular scrimmages, he will never develop a football team. The scrimmage for a student of accounting consists of the assigned problems, the workbook and the practice set. So it seems that it would be desirable for the student to work several problems in connection with each chapter. Apparently many instructors fail to face up to the situation. They recognize the desirability of the scrimmaging, but have found no satisfactory way to handle the grading problem. Often the instructor at least implies that the paper are being graded, but the students suspect that they are not. In a situation where objective tests are effective and in certain types of problem tests much time can be saved by having the students grade their own papers. It seems desirable to go over the test thoroughly with the students at the next class meeting anyway, so then is no loss of classroom time if the students grade their own papers.

Ira C. Castles, The Income Level and Monetary-Fiscal Devices, with Particular Reference to Raising Individual Income Tax Revenue to Prevent Inflation, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Sep., 1957), pp. 387-388

Reviews the book "Fundamental Statistics for Business and Economics," by John Neter and William Wasserman.

The description of politics as art of the applies likewise to public policy in general and to monetary policy in particular. To say that central banking is an art rather than a science, as both students and practitioners of central banking have been accustomed to do, is not to deny that, in this as in every other branch of applied economics, scientific methods and a scientific attitude can be extraordinarily fruitful. But the fact does remain that central banking is an art. The principal weakness of central bankers lies not in any failure to recognize that fact but in deciding what constitutes the possible when it comes to the application of their art. The main difficulty confronting central bankers is that what is possible for central bank policy is in no sense an absolute. It is not that what is possible is merely a matter of expediency, although expediency undoubtedly has to be considered; the policy-maker who disregards what is realistic is only a little less ridiculous than the one who forgets what is ideal.' The more baffling consideration is that what it is possible for central banking to accomplish, and by what means, is relative to many things. These include such internal considerations as the objectives to which it is committed, the guides available to it, the instruments at its disposal. They also include such outside factors as the state of the economy, the international climate both political and economic, and the attitude of the public. While some of these endogenous and exogenous elements are subject to accurate determination or control, others clearly are not. To suggest that the problem of the practitioners of the art of central banking is difficult is not to imply that they do as good a job as can legitimately be asked. A better job can be expected, however, only through heightened sensitivity to the changing environment in which central bankers operate and increased willingness to modify central bank actions in the light of these changes. And it is highly probable that the pressure to effect these adaptations will have to come mainly from students of the art who are outside the system itself.2