This article explores three interconnected decisions related to early retirement- the decision whether to leave a long-term job prior to age 65. the decision whether to accept bridge employment, and the decision whether to obtain bridge employment in the same industry or occupation as the last job- and the relationships among these three decisions and adjustment to retirement. In addition, this article examines the key variables that influence these three decisions, integrating previous research on individual-level, family-level, job- and career-related, organization-level, and environmental-level factors. The article concludes with an examination of methodological issues in the study of early retirement decisions and provides directions for future theory development.

This paper presents an incentive-based theory of the dynamics of the distribution of consumption in the presence of aggregate shocks. The paper builds on the models concerning the distribution of income or consumption and incentive problems of Green (1987), Thomas and Worrall (1991), Phelan and Townsend (1991), and Atkeson and Lucas (1992). By incorporating aggregate production shocks, the model allows an examination of the interactions between individual and aggregate consumption series given incomplete insurance. Further, the methodology outlined allows the incorporation of incentive considerations to macroeconomic environments similar to Rogerson (1988) and Hansen (1985).

The article reviews the book ?Leadership and the New Science: Learning About Organization from an Orderly University,? by Margaret J. Wheatley.

This paper tests an optimal (S, s) rule in household durable purchases and examines directly the resulting aggregate expenditure dynamics. The observed decision rule responds to income uncertainty and growth as predicted by an (S, s) model resulting from transactions costs. Tests against liquidity constraints find that about half the households purchase according to an optimal (S, s) rule. Aggregating the (S, s) rule over households produces a cross-section distribution of durables holdings. The empirical distribution is similar to that predicted theoretically, as is its response to aggregate shocks. Furthermore, simulations of aggregate expenditure based on the household distribution exhibit dynamics consistent with those observed in the 1980s. Copyright 1994 by University of Chicago Press.

ABSTRACT This article presents a model of repurchase tender offers in which firms choose between the Dutch auction method and the fixed price method. Dutch auction repurchases are more effective takeover deterrents, while fixed price repurchases are more effective signals of undervaluation. The model yields empirical implications regarding price effects of repurchases, likelihood of takeover, managerial compensation, and cross‐sectional differences in the elasticity of the supply curve for shares.

This article presents a model of repurchase tender offers in which firms choose between the Dutch auction method and the fixed price method. Dutch auction repurchases are more effective takeover deterrents, while fixed price repurchases are more effective signals of undervaluation. The model yields empirical implications regarding price effects of repurchases, likelihood of takeover, managerial compensation, and cross-sectional differences in the elasticity of the supply curve for shares.

[In a model with asymmetric information and external equity financing, it is impossible to achieve socially optimal investment because of renegotiation possibilities. The contractual solution suggested by Dybvig and Zender (1991) is not dynamically consistent--the manager's contract would be renegotiated, resulting in inefficient investment. Moreover, no other compensation contract that would induce the manager to invest efficiently survives renegotiation. Contracts that pay the manager based on the stock price, while producing suboptimal investment as in Myers and Majluf (1984), are robust to renegotiation.]