This paper presents a statistical procedure to identify effects of three potential structural changes on accounting earnings – temporary, short-run, and long-run. The procedure is applied to quarterly accounting earnings of 39 utility companies. Structural changes are found to be commonplace. Statistical forecasting models that explicitly incorporate structural change effects are found to generate more accurate forecasts than other statistical models in the literature. Although no statistical model significantly dominates Value Line, a firm-specific model with structural change adjustment forecasts as well as Value Line. Moreover, all statistical models examined have significant marginal forecasting power to complement Value Line forecasts.

This paper examines the desirability of allowing a monopolist to determine the market price. The author finds that none of the regulatory mechanisms previously discussed in the "price versus quantities" literature strictly dominates unregulated, monopoly price-setting. Furthermore, despite suggestions by others, price-setting by a regulated monopolist whose profits coincide with society's net benefits is not always the most desirable means of control. Quantity-setting by such a monopolist may instead be the preferred choice. Combining both into one incentive-compatible mechanism provides the best regulatory scheme and one in which the regulator need not be informed about costs.

We applied the VARMA test to examine the dynamic relation between prices and interest rates. The dynamic relation, which is important to characterize the nature of the Gibson paradox, provides economists new insight in discriminating against competing theories. In light of our empirical findings, all theories in the literature lose their persuasiveness. We found some evidence of unidirectional relation from prices to interest rates, but we found no evidence of unidirectional relation from interest rates to prices. Hence, the business cycle explanations advanced by Wicksell (1907), Keynes (1930), Lee and Petruzzi (1986), and Barsky and Summers (1988) are especially in jeopardy. A century and a half after its birth, this paradox is more puzzling than ever.

Capital market data are used to investigate the termination announcement effect of over‐ and underfunded corporate pension plans. Significant positive abnormal returns are initially observed for samples of both over‐ and underfunded plan terminations; however, after segmenting the samples on the basis of publicly available information regarding a firm's financial condition, significant returns are observed only for financially distressed subsamples. The evidence suggests that the property rights to pension fund assets and liabilities reside fully with the sponsoring firm, and that financially distressed firms may effect a wealth transfer to shareholders by fund termination. Résumé. Les auteurs utilisent les données relatives au marché financier pour analyser l'incidence des avis de discontinuation de régimes de retraite surcapitalisés et sous‐capitalisés de sociétés. Des rendements positifs irréguliers importants sont d'abord observés pour des échantillons de cas de discontinuation de régimes surcapitalisés ainsi que sous‐capitalisés; toutefois, après une segmentation des échantillons à partir de l'information mise à la disposition du public concernant la situation financière de la société, des rendements importants sont observés seulement pour les sous‐échantillons de sociétés en difficulté financière. Les résultats donnent à penser que les éléments d'actif et de passif de la caisse de retraite échoient entièrement à la société promotrice et que les sociétés en difficulté financière peuvent procéder à un transfert de richesses au profit des actionnaires par voie de discontinuation du régime.