Cash holding is on average more valuable when firms are managed by overconfident CEOs. Economically, having an overconfident CEO on board is associated with an increase of $0.28 in the value of $1.00 cash holding. The positive effect of CEO overconfidence on the value of cash concentrates among firms that are more likely to suffer from the underinvestment problem (i.e., financially constrained firms which exhibit high growth opportunities). In addition, CEO overconfidence affects negatively the value of cash in firms that are financially unconstrained, a finding which is consistent with the overinvestment hypothesis. The results are robust to various tests and alternative explanations.

We show that firms with younger CEOs are more likely to experience stock price crashes, including crashes caused by revelation of negative news in the form of breaks in strings of consecutive earnings increases. Such strings are accompanied by large increases in CEO compensation that do not dissipate with crashes. These findings suggest that CEOs have financial incentives to hoard bad news earlier in their career, which increases future crashes. This negative impact of CEO age effect is strongest in the presence of managerial discretion. Overall, the findings highlight the importance of CEO age for firm policies and outcomes.

This study presents a theoretical model that links chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence to the value loss of corporate diversification. Consistent with the model's prediction, the findings show that diversified firms run by overconfident CEOs experience value loss compared to diversified firms run by their rational counterparts. Empirically, the value loss is economically significant and ranges between 12.5% and 14.1%. In addition, the model predicts heightened corporate refocusing activity by overconfident CEOs who pursued diversified investments in the past once realized returns fail to match initial expectations. The empirical odds of corporate refocusing decisions are 67% to 98% higher when past diversifications are undertaken by overconfident rather than rational CEOs. Another prediction of the model is that overconfident CEOs exhibit preference for diversified investments, especially in the presence of ample internal funds. This prediction is also strongly supported by the data. Overall, this study proposes CEO overconfidence as a unified and consistent explanation of why firms pursue value-destructive corporate diversification policies and later adopt refocusing policies aiming to restore value.

Based on textual analysis and a comparison of cybersecurity risk disclosures of firms that were hacked to others that were not, we propose a novel firm-level measure of cybersecurity risk for all U.S.-listed firms. We then examine whether cybersecurity risk is priced in the cross-section of stock returns. Portfolios of firms with high exposure to cybersecurity risk outperform other firms, on average, by up to 8.3% per year. Yet, high-exposure firms perform poorly in periods of high cybersecurity risk. Reassuringly, the measure is higher in information-technology industries, correlates with characteristics linked to firms hit by cyberattacks, and predicts future cyberattacks. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online