Improved employment protection may affect corporate trade credit decisions due to increased labor costs. Using the staggered adoption of U.S. state-level Wrongful Discharge Laws as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that suppliers’ provision of trade credit decreases significantly with better labor protection. The trade credit reduction is more pronounced for firms with higher distress risk, financial constraints, and operating leverage. Firms operating in states with lower unionization and in industries with higher labor turnover, and greater product market competition cut their trade credit more. The decrease in trade credit supply also varies with the type of products sold and customer concentration.

Our study examines how the adoption of the inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD) across US state courts affects the relationship between leverage and CEO compensation. We find that the IDD adoption significantly attenuates the typically positive association between leverage and CEO pay. This effect is more pronounced for CEOs with higher ex-ante mobility, greater career concerns, weaker organizational influence, and higher firm-specific skills. Rejecting the IDD, on the other hand, amplifies the positive relationship between leverage and CEO pay. Our findings underscore the influence of labor market dynamics on CEO compensation.