This paper investigates the impact of CEOs' career experiences on corporate investment decisions. We hypothesize that CEOs with more diverse career experiences are less likely to be constrained by insufficient internal capital. The potential mechanism is that rich external experiences help CEOs accumulate social connections and these connections mitigate information asymmetry and lead to better access to external funds. Consistent with this argument, we find that firms with CEOs who have more diverse career experiences exhibit lower investment-cash flow sensitivity and exploit more outside funds, including both bank loans and trade credit. These effects are more pronounced among financially constrained firms. Even controlling for connections gained through financial institutions or government offices, the effect of diversity still remains very strong. Finally, we conduct several tests to mitigate the concern that our results are driven by the endogeneity of CEOs' appointments.

By analyzing a sample of Chinese firms that split their stocks via stock dividends and using proprietary trading data to measure investors' gambling preferences, we find that stock splits raise the stocks' lottery characteristics, making them attractive to gambling investors, who willingly pay higher prices for skewed securities and share firm risk with existing shareholders. Split firms take more risk. Our findings suggest that by attracting gambling investors, stock splits facilitate (large) shareholders to reduce wealth exposures to firm risk and increase the firms' risk-taking capacity. Furthermore, due to the influx of gambling investors and more risk-taking, split firms' return comovement with lottery-like stocks increases, while their market risk decreases, suggesting that stock splits induce fundamental changes to the firms' investor base and risk profile.

This paper investigates how variations in stock-level leverage lead to dynamic intraday trading behavior and illiquidity transmission across different stocks by utilizing a unique, precise, stock-level margin trading dataset. We document that leveraged investors’ need to meet margin call requirements and liquidity demands due to prior market drops results in subsequent selloffs in otherwise stable stocks, particularly in trading sessions in which there is little new information. This effect exists both within and across different industries and is stronger for stocks with less information asymmetry, better liquidity, higher past stock performance, and even during trading suspension. We also find strong evidence on the volatility spillover induced by leverage. Taken together, such findings suggest that our results are driven by illiquidity contagion instead of information spillover. Our study contributes to the research on asset fire sales, margin trading, and funding liquidity during the intraday deleveraging process in financial market turmoil.