This article offers a new method of solution for linear difference equations with Rational Expectations. We provide a description of the complete set of solutions which is shown to depend on arbitrary martingales. We thus avoid the use of "differences of martingales" as introduced by Gourieroux, Broze, Szafarz, while describing the general solution as a dynamic equation with lower order. At the same time we provide a simple algorithm, based on polynomial divisions, to calculate some basic solutions, namely all ARMA solutions.
This paper examines the agency problem between shareholders and debtholders of Japanese and U.S. firms. Whereas U.S. institutional investors are restricted from doing so, Japanese financial institutions take large equity positions in firms to which they lend, particularly in firms more susceptible to the agency problem. Debt ratios of U.S. firms are negatively related to the firm's potential to engage in risky, suboptimal investments, whereas Japanese debt ratios show no such relation. The evidence is consistent with the notion that the agency problem is mitigated to a greater degree in Japan than in the U.S.
A simple real linear-quadratic inventory model is used to determine how cost and demand shocks interacted to cause fluctuations in aggregate inventories and GNP in the United States, 1947–1986. Cost shocks appear to be the predominant source of fluctuations in inventories and are largely, though not exclusively, responsible for the fact that GNP is more variable than final sales. Cost and demand shocks are of roughly equal importance for GNP. These estimates, however, are imprecise. With different, but plausible, values for a certain target inventory-sales ratio, cost shocks are less important than demand shocks for GNP fluctuations.
Strong‐form efficiency on the Toronto Stock Exchange is examined by focusing on the stock price forecasts of brokerage‐firm analysts who follow TSE firms. Two principal analyses are undertaken. First, there is considerable evidence in both the U.S. and U.K. that analysts possess valuable private information at the firm‐specific level. This paper provides evidence that this finding is generalizable to Canadian analysts. Second, U.S. and U.K. studies generally have been based on a single‐factor model (e.g., the CAPM). The choice of benchmarks (CAPM versus APT) has been shown to be important in a variety of contexts. We provide evidence that the choice of benchmark does not alter the fundamental conclusion that Canadian analysts possess valuable private information at the firm‐specific level. Our findings have implications for accounting researchers, namely, the appropriateness of researchers to use CAPM in lieu of the computationally, more burdensome APT and the appropriateness of researchers to use Canadian analyst forecasts when a proxy is required for the (unobservable) market expectation. Résumé. Les auteurs examinent l'efficience « forte » de la Bourse de Toronto, en s'intéressant aux prévisions relatives au prix des actions formulées par les analystes des sociétés de courtage qui suivent les entreprises de la Bourse de Toronto. Deux analyses principales les mènent aux conclusions suivantes. Premièrement, les faits démontrent presque indubitablement que sur le marché des États‐Unis aussi bien que sur celui du Royaume‐Uni, les analystes possèdent de l'information à caractère privé utile, spécifique à l'entreprise. Les résultats de l'étude démontrent que cette constatation peut être généralisée aux analystes canadiens. Deuxièmement, les études des États‐Unis et du Royaume‐Uni sont généralement fondées sur un modèle à un seul facteur (le modèle d'équilibre des marchés financiers, par exemple). Il a été établi que le choix des critères (le modèle d'équilibre des marchés financiers ou la théorie de l'établissement des prix par arbitrage) est important dans des circonstances très diverses. Les auteurs démontrent que le choix des critères n'a aucune incidence sur la conclusion fondamentale selon laquelle les analystes canadiens possèdent de l'information à caractère privé utile, spécifique à l'entreprise. Les résultats de leur étude entrainent certaines conséquences pour les chercheurs du domaine de la comptabilité: ils ont avantage à utiliser le modèle d'équilibre des marchés financiers de préférence à la théorie de l'établissement des prix par arbitrage, qui exige davantage de calculs, et à recourir aux prévisions des analystes canadiens lorsqu'il leur faut un substitut aux anticipations du marché (qui ne peuvent étre observées).
This paper tests the effects of the level and length of unemployment insurance (UI> benefits on unemployment durations.The paper particularly studies individual behavior during the weeks just prior to when benefits lapse.Higher UI benefits are found to have a strong negative effect on the probability of leaving unemployment.However, the probability of leaving unemployment rises dramatically just prior to when benefits lapse When the length of benefits is extended, the probability of a spell ending is also very high in the week benefits were previously expected to lapse.Individual data are used with accurate information on spell durations, and the level and length of benefits.Semipararnetric estimation techniques are used and compared to alternative approaches.The semiparametric approach yields more plausible estimates and provides useful diagnostics.
Journal of Accounting and Economics199012(1-3), 251-280
Firms that alter their divisional configurations on average increase shareholder wealth. Gains appear to come from information about investment opportunities and increases in efficiency. Performance before the restructurings suggests poorly organized firms are motivated by market pressures to change their organizations. Change also occurs in healthy firms as part of the growth process. Restructuring often occurs where there is no evidence of takeover threats. While stock prices increase around the restructurings, there is a contemporaneous decline in earnings due to increased expenses. These findings appear inconsistent with the contention that the market pressures managers into focusing on short-run earnings.