Drawing on the lessons from the global financial crisis and especially from its impact on the banking systems of Eastern Europe, the paper proposes a new practical approach to macroprudential stress testing. The proposed approach incorporates: (i) macroeconomic stress scenarios generated from both a country specific statistical model and historical cross-country crises experience; (ii) indirect credit risk due to foreign currency exposures of unhedged borrowers; (iii) varying underwriting practices across banks and their asset classes based on their relative aggressiveness of lending; (iv) higher correlations between the probability of default and the loss given default during stress periods; (v) a negative effect of lending concentration and residual loan maturity on unexpected losses; and (vi) the use of an economic risk weighted capital adequacy ratio as the relevant outcome indicator to measure the resilience of banks to materializing credit risk. The authors apply the proposed approach to a set of Eastern European banks and discuss the results.

Equilibrium credit is an important concept because it helps to identify excessive credit provision in an economy. This paper proposes a structural approach to determine equilibrium credit which is based on the long-run through-the-cycle transaction demand for credit. Using a panel data set consisting of 49 high and middle-income countries from 1980 to 2010, we show that there exists considerable variation in the cross-country estimates of the income and price elasticities of credit and that the unit elasticity restriction implicitly imposed by the credit-to-GDP ratio is strongly rejected by the data. This suggests that the credit-to-GDP ratio is not appropriate to measure equilibrium credit. We show further that the cross-sectional variation in the income and price elasticities of credit can be related to a set of relevant economic, financial and institutional development indicators of a country. The main determinants that explain the cross-sectional variation in the income and price elasticities are financial depth, access to financial services, use of capital markets, efficiency and funding of domestic banks, central bank independence, the degree of supervisory integration, and the experience of a financial crisis. As an empirical illustration, we compute equilibrium credit and credit gaps for eleven new EU member states using our structural framework and compare it to credit gaps based on the Basel III approach.

This paper studies the effects of hedge disclosure requirements on corporate risk management and product market competition. The analysis is based on a model of market entry and shows that to prevent entry incumbent firms engage in risk management when these activities remain unobserved by outsiders. In the resulting equilibrium, financial markets are well informed and entry is efficient. However, potential attempts for more transparency by additional disclosure requirements introduce a commitment device that provides incumbents with incentives to distort risk management activities thereby influencing entrant beliefs. In equilibrium, firms engage in significant risk-taking. This behavior limits entry and adversely affects the nature of competition in industries.

We introduce a new measure of how close a set of choices is to satisfying the observable implications of rationality and apply it to a large, balanced panel of household level consumption data. This new measure, the minimum cost index, is the minimum cost of breaking all revealed preference cycles found in choices from budget sets. Unlike existing measures of rationality, it responds to both the number and severity of revealed preference violations.

This article develops a theory of resource allocation in internal capital markets that is consistent with the empirical finding that multidivision firms bias their investment levels in favor of divisions with weaker investment prospects. Headquarters has private information about the capital productivities of its divisions; therefore, capital allocations in the present serve as a signal to divisional managers about future allocations. To facilitate effort provision, headquarters biases capital allocation so as to not disclose productivity differences across divisions or to credibly signal their absence. The capital allocation bias is time-varying and the relationship between the bias and the difference in average division productivities is inversely U-shaped.

We take the perspective of an econometrician who wants to determine which of two experiments provides higher expected utility but only knows the decisions under each experiment. To compare these decisions, the econometrician must make inferences about what the experiment might have been for each set of decisions. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition that identifies when every experiment consistent with one set of decisions has a higher value of information than every experiment consistent with the other set of decisions.

Many everyday decisions are made without full examination of all available options, and, as a result, the best available option may be missed. We develop a search-theoretic choice experiment to study the impact of incomplete consideration on the quality of choices. We find that many decisions can be understood using the satisficing model of Herbert Simon (1955): most subjects search sequentially, stopping when a “satisficing” level of reservation utility is realized. We find that reservation utilities and search order respond systematically to changes in the decision making environment. (JEL D03, D12, D83)

The accurate measurement and effective control of financial risk are of crucial importance to risk managers and regulators. However, risk measures are potentially affected by errors in the estimation of model parameters from limited samples, leading to parameter risk. The key contribution of this paper is the formulation of a general framework to hedge this parameter risk. Applying the new framework to credit portfolio modeling, we highlight the importance of parameter risk, estimation methods, and diversification effects.

We study the role of morality in debt repayment, using an experiment with the credit card customers of a large Islamic bank in Indonesia. In our main treatment, clients receive a text message stating that “non-repayment of debts by someone who is able to repay is an injustice.” This moral appeal decreases delinquency by 4.4 percentage points from a baseline of 66 percent and reduces default among customers with the highest ex ante credit risk. Additional treatments help benchmark the effects against direct financial incentives and rule out competing explanations, such as reminder effects, priming religion, and provision of new information.