We examine the impact of creditor control rights on corporate acquisitions. Nearly 75% of loan agreements include restrictions that limit borrower acquisition decisions throughout the life of the contract. Following a financial covenant violation, creditors use their bargaining power to tighten these restrictions and limit acquisition activity, particularly deals expected to earn negative announcement returns. Firms that do announce an acquisition after violating a financial covenant earn 1.8% higher stock returns, on average, and do not pursue less risky deals. We conclude that creditors use contractual rights and the renegotiation process to limit value-destroying acquisitions driven by managerial agency problems.

Recent progress has outmoded many traditional standards of financial administration of governmental units. Among the more significant changes in concept are (1) greater recognition that financial management must be an integral part of total management at each level to be effective; (2) greater emphasis on the inter-relationships of programming, budgeting, accounting and reporting, and (3) greater awareness and acceptance of the need for variable patterns of accounting compatible with assignments of managerial responsibility and the type of operation being conducted. This proposed statement is an effort to express in broad terms the current accounting and related standards of governmental financial administration. Preparation of a budget for a governmental unit should begin with a determination of the work to be done and the expenses of doing it. Such a cost-based budget and the cash requirements stemming therefrom should be submitted to the legislative branch as a basis for appropriation action. After legislative action, cost-based budgets should be used to control work being done. The cost-based budget is the standard against which the actual costs incurred are to be measured. Responsibility for review, appraisal and action rests on supervision at every level. An independent financial examination and review of operations should be made.

It has long been hypothesized that individuals' migration propensities depend on their risk attitudes, but the empirical evidence has been limited and indirect. We use newly available data from the German Socio-Economic Panel to measure directly the relationship between migration and risk attitudes. We find that individuals who are more willing to take risks are more likely to migrate. Our estimates are substantial compared to unconditional migration probabilities, as well the effects of conventional determinants of migration, and are robust to controlling for a variety of demographic characteristics. We find no evidence that our results are the result of reverse causality.