We examine the relation between the fees paid to auditors for audit and non‐audit services, and the choice of accrual measures for a large sample of firms. Using our pooled sample, we find that the ratio of non‐audit fees to total fees has a positive relation with the absolute value of accruals similar to Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson [2002]. However, using latent class mixture models to identify clusters of firms with a homogenous regression structure reveals that this positive association only occurs for about 8.5% of the sample. In contrast to the fee ratio results, we find consistent evidence of a negative relation between the level of fees (both audit and non‐audit) paid to auditors and accruals (i.e., higher fees are associated with smaller accruals). The latent class analysis also indicates that this negative relation is strongest for client firms with weak governance. Overall, our results are most consistent with auditor behavior being constrained by the reputation effects associated with allowing clients to engage in unusual accrual choices.

It Is commonplace within the confines of finance literature to explain variations in the firm's residual income stream via the dichotomy of business risk and financial risk. On an ex-post basis the business risk of the enterprise is a direct result of the firm's investment decision and is, thereby, embodied in its asset structure. It follows that the company's cost structure, product demand characteristics, intra-industry competitive position, and managerial talent all affect its business risk posture.

The empirical research examining the association between typical measures of corporate governance and various accounting and economic outcomes has not produced a consistent set of results. We believe that these mixed results are partially attributable to the difficulty in generating reliable and valid measures for the complex construct that is termed “corporate governance.” Using a sample of 2,106 firms and 39 structural measures of corporate governance (e.g., board characteristics, stock ownership, institutional ownership, activist stock ownership, existence of debtholders, mix of executive compensation, and anti-takeover variables), our exploratory principal component analysis suggests that there are 14 dimensions to corporate governance. We find that these indices have a mixed association with abnormal accruals, little relation to accounting restatements, but some ability to explain future operating performance and future excess stock returns.

1. An Introduction to Financial Management.Appendix: Methods of Depreciation. 2. The Role of Financial Markets and Interest Rates in Financial Management. 3. Evaluating a Firms Financial Performance and Measuring Cash Flow. 4. Financial Forecasting, Planning, and Budgeting. 5. The Time Value of Money. 6. Risk and Rates of Return.Appendix: Measuring the Required Rate of Return: The Arbitrage Pricing Model. 7. Bond Valuation. 8. Stock Valuation.Appendix: The Relationship Between Value and Earnings. 9. Capital-Budgeting Decision Criteria. 10. Cash Flows and Other Topics in Capital Budgeting. 11. Capital Budgeting and Risk Analysis. 12. Cost of Capital. 13. Analysis and Impact of Leverage. 14. Planning the Firms Financing Mix. 15. Dividend Policy and Internal Financing. 16. Working-Capital Management and Short-Term Financing. 17. Cash and Marketable Securities Management.Appendix: Cash-Management Models: Split Between Cash and Near Cash. 18. Accounts Receivable, Inventory, and Total Quality Management. 19. Term Loans and Leases. 20. The Use of Futures, Options, and Currency Swaps to Reduce Risk.Appendix: Convertible Securities and Warrants. 21. Corporate Restructuring: Combinations and Divestitures. 22. International Business Finance. Appendix A: Using a Calculator. Appendix B: Compound Sum of $1. Appendix C: Present Value of $1. Appendix D: Sum of an Annuity of $1 for n Periods. Appendix E: Present Value of an Annuity of $1 for n Periods. Appendix F: Solutions for Selected End-of-Chapter Problems. Glossary. Organization Index. Subject Index.