We use an asset pricing approach to compare the effects of the liquidity level and liquidity risk on expected U.S. corporate bond returns. Using signed transaction data, we estimate effective transaction costs for bond portfolios by a repeat-sales method. We find that the liquidity level and exposure to equity market liquidity risk affect expected bond returns. In contrast, exposure to corporate bond liquidity shocks carries an economically negligible risk premium. A simulation study shows that it is unlikely that our results are driven by measurement error in betas or multicollinearity. We present a simple theoretical model that explains these findings.

We propose a new private information measure based on a model of strategic trade optimization in the cross section of securities. Investors receive liquidity and private information shocks and optimize trading across securities, accounting for price impact (Kyle’s λ). The model yields a simple private information measure: λ×OIB (order imbalance). Intuitively, order imbalance is more likely to be information-driven when trading is expensive. We validate our measure by showing that it is greater for smaller firms with higher analyst dispersion, peaks with insider trades, helps explain return reversals, predicts return volatility, and increases before M&A announcements and after analyst coverage terminations. (JEL G11, G12, G14)

We model endogenous technology adoption and competition among liquidity providers with access to High-Frequency Trading (HFT) technology. HFT technology provides speed and information advantages. Information advantages may restore excessively toxic markets. Speed advantages may reduce resource costs for liquidity provision. Both effects increase liquidity and welfare. However, informationally advantaged HFTs may impose a winner’s curse on traditional market makers, who in response reduce their participation. This increases resource costs and lowers the execution likelihood for market orders, thereby reducing liquidity and welfare. This result also holds when HFT technology dominates traditional technology in terms of costs and informational advantages.

We jointly model green and regular bond markets. Green bonds can improve allocative efficiency and lower financing costs for green projects, but economies of scale, like liquidity fragmentation, may cause friction. Consequently, profitable and welfare-enhancing projects, green and brown, can be rationed in equilibrium. Rationing green projects happens with a shortage of climate investors, large non-monetary offsets, and/or costly fragmentation. Rationing regular projects can happen with a shortage of regular investors, but also with an abundance, when more profitable green projects crowd out regular ones. We propose an alternative security design that preserves green earmarking but prevents fragmentation.

Traders may run on financial markets merely out of fear of future liquidity shocks. We present a model that shows that adequately calibrated circuit breakers can prevent such coordination failures by curbing excessive trading. It suggests a novel, forward-looking circuit breaker that becomes most restrictive in cases when expected welfare losses of inefficient market runs are largest. The probabilities of current and future liquidity shortages are important determinants for such welfare-optimized circuit breakers. We empirically illustrate how to calibrate these parameters. We also determine under which economic conditions circuit breakers damage welfare and should not be implemented.

Regulatory capital requirements for European banks have been put forward in the Basel II Capital Framework and subsequently in the capital requirements directive (CRD) of the EU. We provide a detailed discussion of the capital requirements for private equity investments under different approaches. For the internal model approach we present a structural model that we calibrate to a proprietary dataset. We modify the standard Merton structural model to make it applicable in practice and to capture stylized facts of private equity investments. We also implement the early default feature with a fast simulation algorithm. Our results support capital requirements lower than in Basel II, but not as low as in CRD, thereby giving adverse incentives to banks for using advanced risk models. A sensitivity analysis shows that this finding is robust to parameter uncertainty and stress scenarios.

We use an asset pricing approach to compare the effects of the liquidity level and liquidity risk on expected U.S. corporate bond returns. Using signed transaction data, we estimate effective transaction costs for bond portfolios by a repeat-sales method. We find that the liquidity level and exposure to equity market liquidity risk affect expected bond returns. In contrast, exposure to corporate bond liquidity shocks carries an economically negligible risk premium. A simulation study shows that it is unlikely that our results are driven by measurement error in betas or multicollinearity. We present a simple theoretical model that explains these findings.

ABSTRACT This paper explores the economic role credit rating agencies play in the corporate bond market. We consider three existing theories about multiple ratings: information production, rating shopping, and regulatory certification. Using differences in rating composition, default prediction, and credit spread changes, our evidence only supports regulatory certification. Marginal, additional credit ratings are more likely to occur because of, and seem to matter primarily for, regulatory purposes. They do not seem to provide significant additional information related to credit quality.

We derive an equilibrium asset pricing model incorporating liquidity risk, derivative assets, and short-selling due to hedging of non-traded risk. We show that, both for positive-net-supply assets and derivatives, the sign of liquidity effects depends on investor heterogeneity in non-traded risk exposure, risk aversion, horizon and wealth. We also show that liquidity risk affects derivatives in a different way than positive-net-supply assets. We estimate this model for the credit default swap market using GMM. We find strong evidence for an expected liquidity premium earned by the credit protection seller. The effect of liquidity risk is significant but economically small.